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Website cloaking is a technique that enables websites to deliver different content to
different clients, with the goal of hiding particular content from certain clients. Website
cloaking is based on client detection, which is achieved via browser fingerprinting. In an
attempt to hide their malicious web pages from detection, cyber criminals use cloaking.
They use vulnerability detection to only target clients that seem vulnerable. On top
of that, they also provide benign content in case they suspect someone or something is
trying to detect them.
On the other hand, security analysts use security web crawlers, automated tools
that crawl web pages and analyze them, for example to find malicious web pages. One
example of such tools are honeyclients, also known as client honeypot web bots. Honey-
clients are browser clients that are purposefully left vulnerable or that emulate vulnerable
browsers. They are the client equivalent of a so-called server honeypot [QH10; QZ11],
a server that is left vulnerable on purpose to lure in attackers, thus distracting and de-
tecting them. The goal of a honeyclient is to detect webpages delivering malicious code.
They are a potential counter to cloaking. While there is prior research into bot detection
and browser fingerprinting [JKV19], it is currently not clear to what extent security web
crawlers are distinguishable from regular clients, and thus whether cybercriminals can
avoid sending malware to such clients by using generic cloaking techniques. It is also not
clear to what extent cyber security professionals and their organisations are aware of and
prepared for web based attacks using cloaking, or how their awareness and preparedness
could be improved.
In this work, we investigate to what extent security web crawlers can be detected
by browser fingerprinting techniques, and provide suggestions for how to improve them
to better hide from those techniques. We survey security analysts and analyse a set of
threat intelligence sharing communities, to gauge awareness of cloaking as an available
detection evasion method for cybercriminals. Finally, we investigate one final technique,




• We present a review of prior research into the efficacy of a low interaction honey-
client in bypassing targeting techniques.
• We present a new, expanded and actualized, set of targeting techniques to test the
efficacy of security web crawlers.
• We develop a new cloaking demonstration site implementing those techniques.
• We determine the ability of four publicly available security web crawlers to bypass
the aforementioned targeting techniques using the created demonstration site.
• We propose potential improvements of security web crawlers to make them more
effective at bypassing cloaking techniques.
• We present what we believe to be the first survey of cyber security profession-
als to gauge awareness and preparedness of cyber security professionals and their
organisations to deal with cloaking web attacks.
• We examine tooling support to share cloaking related threat intelligence, in an
open source threat intelligence sharing tool with a large user base, called MISP.
• We show that rudimentary awareness with regards to web cloaking attacks exists
in some MISP threat intelligence sharing communities.
• We show that there is a significant difference in browser forensic artifacts for




Problem statement and research
questions
2.1 Problem statement
Malicious content delivery via the web remains a prevalent threat for individuals and
organisations. Some aspects, such as the effectiveness of security web crawlers (for
example honey clients) in dealing with generic cloaking techniques, and the awareness
and preparedness of organisations to deal with such attacks, have not been discussed in
prior research.
2.2 Research questions
• RQ1 How effective are commonly used security web crawlers, one of the tools used
to counter malicious web content delivery, at bypassing targeting techniques com-
monly used in cloaking and how could their efficacy in bypassing these techniques
be improved?
– RQ1-1 How effective are publicly available security web crawlers, one of the
tools used to counter malicious web content delivery, at bypassing cloaking
techniques?
– RQ1-2 How could security web crawlers’ efficacy at bypassing cloaking tech-
niques be improved?
• RQ2 How aware and prepared are cyber security professionals and their organi-
sations when it comes to cloaking attacks, and how can their awareness and pre-
paredness be improved?
– RQ2-1 How aware are cyber security professionals and their organisations of
cloaking techniques?
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– RQ2-2 How prepared are organisations for dealing with malicious web con-
tent delivery attacks using cloaking techniques?
– RQ2-3 What additional steps can organisations take to improve awareness
and preparedness to deal with malicious web content delivery attacks using
cloaking techniques?








collection, uses and prevention
Browser fingerprinting refers to the process of collecting information through a web
browser and web server, to build a fingerprint of a device or user, as well as the process
of using a previously determined browser fingerprint to re-identify a user or device.
Such a browser fingerprint is a set of attributes, attribute values, and behaviours of a
browser and its underlying system, collectable via the browser, which together uniquely
distinguish this browser from any other.
Browser fingerprinting techniques form the basis of cloaking. The cloaking logic uses
the client’s browser fingerprint to determine which content should be delivered. We
focus on browser fingerprinting rather than the default identification technique on the
web, cookies, because it has capabilities that can not be achieved with cookies, such
as determining the browser family and version. A cookie can be part of a browser
fingerprint however.
We intentionally limit our concept of browser fingerprint to the application layer of
the OSI model. This excludes some attributes that could identify a browser by other
means, such as network packet information captured on the wire [WG13].
3.1 Fingerprinting process
In this section we explain the main fingerprinting process, which entities can be finger-
printed and the difference between active and passive fingerprinting.
3.1.1 Fingerprinting and re-identification
The core fingerprinting process boils down to two main steps. In the first step, the
fingerprint of a particular client is collected or determined. The second step consists of
matching the fingerprint of a client, against a list of known fingerprints, to re-identify
the client on each visit. The end goal is to vary the content that is sent to the client
based on the identity of the user.
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We can draw an analogy with the physical world. Imagine you own a coffee shop.
You might want to give different service to people you know frequent your shop. ”Do
you want to have the usual?” would not be something you say to a new customer for
example. It is your knowledge about this particular client that allows you to vary your
service.
There are different ways to collect or determine fingerprints to use for matching later.
Some examples:
• Collect fingerprints of clients whenever a page you host is visited and store the
information.
• Use research to determine what you expect certain attributes of the particular
client to be. This could even be information gained from pictures such as one show-
ing a politician using a fairly uncommon mobile phone with a particular browser.
3.1.2 Which entities are fingerprinted?
Browser fingerprinting techniques can be used to fingerprint different types of entities.
We introduce the following concept:
Web identity The identity of any entity that accesses the web, either directly or
indirectly.
We can distinguish between the following types of web identities:
• User A human user
• Browser A particular browser instance running on a specific system
• Device Any system, such as a smartphone, tablet or PC
We note that in some cases, a group of web identities is targeted. This could for
example be web identities that belong to a certain organisation, or all smartphones
running a particular version of the Android operating system. For an attacker to be
able to do this, there needs to be some commonality between the fingerprints of the web
identities.
3.1.3 Active vs passive fingerprinting
As Torres, Jonker and Mauw mentioned, a distinction can be made between active and
passive fingerprinting [TJM15].
Active fingerprinting – probing Active fingerprinting or probing uses client side
scripts (JavaScript, Flash, Java) to gather browser attributes.
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Passive fingerprinting Passive fingerprinting uses attributes that are sent by the




A shortcoming was observed in existing literature by Rik Dolfing and his thesis super-
visor Hugo Jonker [Dol19]. It was noted that the existing categorisations of browser
fingerprinting techniques such as the ones mentioned by Nikiforakis et al. [Nik+13] and
Upathilake, Li and Matrawy [ULM15] are insufficient and need to be revised. For exam-
ple, Nikiforakis et al. [Nik+13] categorised both Font Detection (detected fonts could be
considered a better term) and User-agent under Operating System & Applications. In
our opinion, there are very clear differences between the two, specifically if a side channel
is used to probe for fonts. A major difference is that font probing checks behaviour of
a browser, while the User-agent string is just a property. Discussions with peers and
a review of categorisations in other research areas mentioning identification, led to an
initial refinement of a new categorisation.
We believe that having a clear categorisation scheme or taxonomy can be helpful for
multiple reasons. Firstly, categorizing things helps humans make sense of them [MR03]
and can be an essential part of learning [Har17]. Categorisations also play a significant
role in human communication [MR03]. We believe categorising fingerprinting techniques
makes it easier to reason about groups of techniques, for example when determining mea-
sures against those techniques. Lastly, we hope that thinking about browser fingerprint-
ing techniques in a different way sparks new ideas for potential techniques or techniques
that might already be used but have not been described yet. Below we introduce the
taxonomy for fingerprinting techniques proposed by Dolfing and Jonker [Dol19]. This
new taxonomy includes techniques based on behaviour of the web identity.
The categorisation
System properties All properties of the underlying system on which the browser
is running. These properties are independent of the properties of the user or browser.
Examples of system properties are the operating system and the installed model of
graphics card. Properties that depend on the user, such as the list of installed custom
fonts, are excluded and considered part of the user properties.
System behaviour All behaviour that is specific to the underlying system on which
the browser is running. An example of this is the behaviour of the system under certain
types of load, for example using a benchmarking tool. It is important to note that
many browser fingerprinting techniques tracking system behaviour, are used to determine
system properties. One such case is determining whether the system’s CPU supports
the extended instructions of AES-NI [Sai+16]. These instructions provide hardware
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acceleration for encryption and decryption using the AES cryptographic algorithm. The
visible behaviour is a difference in processing time when enabling the feature during
benchmarking. The actual underlying property that is determined is whether AES-NI
extensions are part of the CPU instruction set.
Browser properties All properties of the browser that is used to connect to the
server. An example is the User-Agent. Properties that depend on the user, such as the
list of installed extensions, are excluded and considered part of the user properties.
Browser behaviour All behaviour that is specific to a particular browser. Examples
are the browser fingerprint and the ability to pass certain standardised JavaScript engine
tests.
User properties All properties that are directly influenced by the user of the client
that is connecting to the server. This includes installed plugins, extensions, set cookies
and installed custom fonts. While it might be possible to use browser fingerprinting
techniques to determine other personal user properties such as sex, these properties are
usually not used in a fingerprint.
User behaviour All behaviour of the human user (if there is any) that is connecting
to the server. Examples include mouse movement and typing speed.
Examples of categorised fingerprintable attributes can be found in Table 3.1.
Properties Behaviour
System Screen width Ability to handle multiproces-
sor tasks
System+Browser User-Agent The way fonts are displayed,
Canvas fingerprint
Browser Browser family and version JavaScript engine conformance
test performance




Table 3.1: Examples of categorised fingerprintable attributes
Discussion
The current taxonomy is a proposal, which can be tested in future research. The com-
pleteness of the proposed taxonomy should be verified. Every known fingerprintable
attribute should fall under one of the proposed categories, otherwise the taxonomy is
not complete.
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Aside from that, we realized that the proposed taxonomy leads to cases where a fin-
gerprintable attribute ends up in a combined category, meaning the value is determined
by multiple layers, for example system and browser in the case of a canvas fingerprint.
This example feels rather intuitive. There are others that require some more thought.
The list of all installed default fonts can be seen as a system property. Which custom
fonts are installed is entirely determined by the user however. While a User-Agent often
contains system information, it is entirely up to the browser to set it and not controlled
by the system at all.
Furthermore, we want to point out that in some cases behaviour is used to determine
a property. As a result, we feel it is very important to mention what the goal is of the
fingerprinting technique and what is actually being fingerprinted. This can result in one
technique both fingerprinting behaviour and a property.
Finally, one of the major reasons for introducing this new taxonomy differentiating
between behaviour and properties, was the realization that a property fingerprint can
be captured fully, while this is practically impossible for behaviour. For example, it is
possible to capture all the elements in the DOM [Dol19]. The same can not be said for
getting all installed custom fonts using font probing. Font probing checks whether a font
in a predetermined list is installed. If the user installed a custom font the fingerprinter
doesn’t know, it is not checked for. The list of custom fonts that can be installed can
be practically infinite. This leads to specific problems. It is practically impossible for
a fingerprinter to fingerprint all behaviour and vice versa it is practically impossible for
browsers or users to protect against all forms of behavioural fingerprinting.
3.2.2 Identifiable elements and identifiable behaviour
An identifiable element is an attribute or set of attributes that can be used to re-identify
a web identity at a later time. An analogy can be made to identifying suspects in a bank
robbery investigation. Both the color of a person’s eyes (an attribute) as well as the fact
the person had a goth look based on dark clothing and a choker around neck (combined
attributes) can be seen as identifiable elements.
Below we provide a non exhaustive list of identifiable elements that have been de-
scribed in prior research. We chose the below examples because they either get mentioned
in related work frequently, or because we deemed them to be fairly creative and surpris-
ing options. As a result, the below list should give the reader a sense of which types
of attributes can be fingerprinted. A more extensive set of examples can be found at
https://amiunique.org/fp.
User-Agent The User-Agent depends on the browser vendor and version, by design1.
An example of a User-Agent string is: ”Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/86.0.4240.198 Safari/537.36”.
1https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1945#page-46
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HTML5 Canvas The HTML5 canvas element2 can be used to programmatically draw
images on a web page. The rendering of this image is dependent on the hardware of the
system. As a result, and because the pixel information can be gathered via an API, it is
possible to use a canvas element to create an identifiable element. Mowery and Shacham
were the first people to describe this technique [MS12] in 2012.
Figure 3.1: HTML5 canvas image
JavaScript Engine Compliance This technique was introduced by Mulazzani et
al [Mul+13] in 2013. They showed that the results of a browser in JavaScript Engine
Conformance tests can be used to determine which browser and browser version is con-
necting to the server. JavaScript code to run a set of tests is sent to the client and is then
run client-side. These tests check for compliance to the ECMAScript standard3. The
results are sent back to the server. Assuming the only browsers connecting to our server
are the ones in the table below, we can uniquely identify the browser by only running
2 tests, for example tests 2 and 3. If both tests passed, the client is using browser 2,
version Z. In the other cases the failing test immediately leads to one of the other two
options. This process can be optimized by using a decision tree.
JavaScript engine conformance tests
Browser Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4








Browser 2, version Z
√ √ √
Fail
Table 3.2: Illustration of JavaScript Conformance tests differences
Enabled plugins The list of enabled plugins could be enumerated. As users can
install different plugins, this list can be distinct for a particular browser. The list could
be accessed using the navigator.plugins object for example4. Due to privacy concerns,
this function has become deprecated.






Font metrics In 2015, Fifield and Egelman described a novel method for fingerprinting
based on font metrics [FE15]. It appears some browsers render the same character
differently. This leads to variations in the size of the rendered character. By setting a
large font-size, the effect of these variations on the size increases as well, making them
more easy to detect. This technique does not use the HTML5 canvas element and can
work even when a browser has protection against canvas fingerprinting.
Battery Status In 2015, Olejnik et al. showed that certain battery status details can
be used for fingerprinting [Ole+15]. These details are exposed via the battery status
API. The researchers submitted a bug report to Firefox for one of the issues with the
implementation of this API, which made it possible to determine the battery capacity
of the connecting device with a relatively high accuracy. Mozilla implemented a fix as
a result. Regardless, it is still possible to use the battery status API for short term
fingerprinting purposes.
CPU features In 2016, Saito et al. [Sai+16] showed that it is possible to estimate
whether the CPU of the system on which the client application is installed has certain
hardware features. This allows detection of AES-NI and Intel Turbo Boost Technology
support. These properties can then be used as an extra identifiable element.
Audio device features In 2014, Zhou et al. [Zho+14] showed that it is possible to
use high frequency audio output of speakers as a feature, by playing a crafted audio
fragment and recording it with an Android phone’s microphone.
3.3 Characteristics of a fingerprint
Building on the knowledge about the fingerprinting process and fingerprintable at-
tributes, we can now discuss some characteristics of a fingerprint. A browser fingerprint
is in essence a set of current values for certain attributes. The two main characteristics
of a fingerprint are its uniqueness and stability, these concepts are explained in the fol-
lowing subsections. The effectiveness and stability of the fingerprints used relies on the
selected attributes and how the values for them are determined. An example of potential
differences between fingerprints can be seen in the table below.
Attributes used in fingerprint




√ √ √ √1
Site 3
√ √ √ √1
1 site 2 and 3 use different canvas fingerprinting techniques
Table 3.3: Illustration of different fingerprint implementations – selected attributes
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3.3.1 Uniqueness
To be able to use a specific fingerprint to identify a particular web identity, the fingerprint
of that web identity has to be unique. The less common the values of the web identities’
fingerprint are, the more unique the overall fingerprint is. The amount of information
expressed by a certain identifiable attribute is commonly measured in entropy.
For a more mathematical analysis of the uniqueness of a fingerprint in a particular
set of collected fingerprints, and a discussion of how this might be extrapolated to the
global set of fingerprints, we refer to the paper by Eckersley [Eck10].
3.3.2 Stability
As the goal of browser fingerprinting is to match a collected fingerprint against a selected
fingerprint, a fingerprint should remain relatively stable for this to be possible. Some
web identities’ fingerprint are less stable than others. Examples of reasons for this are
more frequent updating of the browser, changing network environments and extensions
that are designed to break stability of the fingerprint.
3.4 Use cases
In this section we discuss different use cases for the browser fingerprinting. It is important
to note that the web server is always the fingerprinter and thus has control over which
use cases are implemented. While some of these use cases are clearly meant to improve
the service for the users, others are there solely to protect the web server or to provide
benefits to the owner of the service. In multiple scenarios, there is a trade-off between a
positive effect for one of the two parties and a negative effect on the other.
Risk-based authentication Passwords are an imperfect solution for authentication [Bon+15].
In an attempt to decrease the chances of someone else logging in to your account without
authorization, websites have started implementing multi-factor authentication mecha-
nisms. Such mechanisms ensure that at least two authentication factors have to be
provided before you are successfully authenticated. A site might request you to provide
a password and a code sent to your phone by SMS for example. While adding multiple
authentication factors can increase security, it also has a negative impact on usability.
Risk-based authentication is the modification of the authentication mechanism based
on the perceived risk of the new authentication. In the context of web applications,
attributes of the browser can be used to estimate the risk of the new authentication
and modify the authentication mechanism accordingly. In practice, this might mean
you have to provide a code sent to your phone by SMS the first time you log in from
a device you hadn’t used to connect to that site before, but not when connecting from
a trusted browser. Technically, browser fingerprinting techniques can also be used to
counter session hijacking attacks. The goal of risk-based authentication is to increase
security while limiting the impact on usability of the service.
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Alerting of potentially unauthorized login Instead of denying access to a service,
or requesting an extra authentication factor based on the risk of the authentication re-
quest, a web application can also notify the legitimate user of a potentially unauthorized
login5, by sending an alert via a predetermined communication channel such as email.
While this does not completely block the login, it allows the legitimate user to take ac-
tion in case the account is indeed compromised. This alerting can be used in situations
where the perceived risk of the login being unauthorized, is relatively low.
Targeted advertising Advertisers pay money to advertisement platforms or websites
to host their ads. To increase the value advertisers get for their money, many adver-
tisement platforms allow advertisers to choose who their ads are showed to by setting
certain parameters. Possible parameters include IP, browser, operating system, gender
and social class, amongst others6. While receiving more relevant ads might be conve-
nient for users as well, in many cases the means that are used to achieve this targeting
raise major privacy concerns.
Collection of personal information to sell to third parties Unbeknownst to
many users, online service providers collect and sell personal information [FH18]. These
providers often defend this practice by saying the data is anonymized7. Unfortunately,
anonymized data can often be de-anonymized by combining it with other data [HL21].
Impersonation detection Some people impersonate someone else online, enabling
them to cause major issues for other users. An example of this is male sexual predators
pretending to be younger or a different gender. Browser fingerprinting techniques can
potentially be used to detect impersonation. Van Balen, Wang and Ball [BBW17] showed
that it is possible to determine the gender of a user by tracking certain mouse movements,
which might be possible via a browser as well. Pusara and Brodley showed that user re-
authentication via mouse movements in browsers is possible [PB04], making the proposed
use case plausible as well.
Bot detection Web bots are automated clients running tasks on the web. Usage of this
technology can help improve the quality of the service. An example of this is automated
web testing, which can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of testing. Unfortunately
web bots are also used for less honorable practices such as ad-fraud, intellectual property
theft (via web crawling) and credential stuffing. Browser fingerprinting techniques can
be used to detect and block incoming connections of web bots [JKV19]. Anti-scraping






Region-based content locking Due to regulatory or licensing reasons, a website
might choose not to allow users from certain regions to access particular content. This
can be achieved with the use of browser fingerprinting. An example of such a scenario
are video streaming platforms that only allow visitors from certain countries to watch
particular videos8.
Web tracking Since browser fingerprinting allows re-identification of a client, it can
be used [Eck10] to track that client’s actions on the web on each site that includes the
fingerprinters’ code.
Vulnerability detection (both for offensive and defensive purposes) Browser
fingerprinting techniques can be used to detect vulnerabilities of the browser [SLG19][Lap+20]
and the system the browser is running on. This can allow a malicious actor to craft a
specific attack against the vulnerable system either directly or at a later time, using the
acquired knowledge. It can also be used by defenders to detect weaknesses in systems
to patch.
Cloaking In an attempt to hide their malicious pages from detection, cyber criminals
use browser context information to vary the content they send to visiting clients [Zha+21].
In case they suspect someone or something is trying to detect them, they provide benign
content. Aside from that, they also use vulnerability detection to only target vulnerable
clients.
Cookie regeneration Browser fingerprinting techniques can be used to regenerate
cookies after deletion [Lap+20]. As a result, even if the user thinks she is no longer
tracked because she deleted tracking cookies, this is not necessarily the case.
3.5 Browser fingerprinting adoption
In 2013, Nikiforakis et al. [Nik+13] showed that at least 0.4% of the Alexa top 10,000
sites were using fingerprinting scripts from at least one of three commercial companies:
BlueCava, Iovation and ThreatMetrix. Since they only crawled 20 pages for each site
and did not access any as registered users, this result is a lower bound.
In 2014, Acar et al. [Aca+14] found that at least 5.5% of the Alexa top 100,000
included a canvas fingerprinting script on their home pages. 20 different fingerprinting
provider domains were identified. 9 of those were inhouse, first party domains. 11 were
third party providers.
In 2016, Englehardt and Narayanan found that 7% of the Alexa top 10,000 sites used




of canvas fingerprinting is more prevalent amongst the top sites compared to the lower
ranked sites.
In 2019, Jonker et al. [JKV19] showed that 12.8% of the Alexa Top 1 Million sites
showed indications of bot detection using fingerprinting techniques.
3.6 Countermeasures
3.6.1 Generic types of defenses
A distinction can be made between several types of defenses, which we present below.
Each of these has their own scope and merits, a comprehensive defensive strategy should
use a combination of the below types.
Prevention Prevent a compromise or attack altogether. A firewall rule could block a
connection to a specific system for example.
Detection Detect when an attack happened. An alert could be raised when a system
attempts to initiate a connection it shouldn’t, for example.
Mitigation A mitigation doesn’t prevent an attack from succeeding, but reduces the
impact when it does. An example is the limit most people have on the amount of money
they can send per day using their bank details. Even if someone gets hold of a user’s
debit or credit card and pin code, they can only use it to send a limited amount of
money.
Physical Physical protection, such as the door and lock of a house to prevent people
from entering.
Logical, technical A technical protection such as a firewall rule.
Administrative Administrative protection such as a policy or law, such as as policy
stating corporate devices can not be utilized for personal use.
3.6.2 High level strategies against browser fingerprinting
Limit exposure of browser details
As mentioned earlier, one of the main reasons browser fingerprinting is possible, is the
fact that browsers simply expose a lot of information, for example through APIs. One
strategy is to simply limit the information available through the APIs. Depending on
the extent to which information is limited, this can prevent fingerprinting using the
particular attribute or reduce the effectiveness of the fingerprinting technique.
To illustrate this strategy, we refer back to the battery API issue mentioned earlier.
On Linux, the precision of the returned battery status value was a 64 bit double-precision
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floating-point number [Ole+15], which is unnecessarily precise. Rounding the value to
two significant digits makes it much harder to abuse.
Increase uniformity → break uniqueness
If you want to hide in the crowd, you have to make sure you don’t stand out in the
crowd like the yellow chair in Figure 3.2. This strategy works by adopting a browser
configuration that is exactly the same or very similar to that of other users. In effect,
this renders it impossible for a fingerprinter to distinguish your browser from others. In
the example picture below, the yellow chair is very easy to distinguish from the others.
The others all look alike however, and it would be much harder to identify one particular
green one.
An example use of this strategy could be an organisation only allowing internet
access with a browser from a virtual environment hosted on shared hardware. If the
configuration of the browser cannot be changed by the end users, all system and browser
level attributes would be the same. As a result it would be more difficult to use browser
fingerprinting to identify a particular user within the organisation.
Figure 3.2: Unique stadium chair, yellow, is easy to pinpoint
Break linkability
A second possible strategy is to make sure your fingerprint changes often over time,
in such a way that it is impossible to link your new fingerprint to the older one. An
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illustrative example with a real life criminal is the convicted serial killer Theodore Robert
Bundy, more commonly known as Ted Bundy. Ted changed his appearance over time
in an attempt to make it harder for police to track him down, as can be seen in the
different mugshots in Figure 3.3. The same strategy to counter tracking can be applied
to web browsers. Increasing randomness of a browser fingerprint is one way of breaking
linkability.
A specific example of this strategy is the ’farbling’ or randomization the Brave
browser does for the canvas image9.
Figure 3.3: Breaking linkability example – Ted Bundy mugshots
3.6.3 Particular tool implementations and ideas
In this section we present a non exhaustive list of tools that have been designed to
prevent or mitigate browser fingerprinting attempts.
Script-blocking tools These tools completely block certain scripts from running.
Examples include No-Script, Ghostery and Privacy badgers. They all use the limit
exposure of browser details strategy.
Tor browser The Tor browser10 is a browser designed to access an uncensored web
privately. It has built-in protections against browser fingerprinting11. Tor browser has
chosen to mainly use the increasing uniformity and limiting exposure strategies.
Firegloves A Firefox plugin to ”impede fingerprinting-based tracking while maintain-
ing browsing experience”12 [Aca+13]. It uses the breaking linkability and limiting expo-
sure strategies. This project is no longer under active development.
FP-Block FP-Block is a Firefox plugin that uses the breaking linkability strategy






It still allows tracking within one domain. As a result, the impact on usability is min-
imized. The creators paid extra attention to making sure the spoofed fingerprint does
not have contradictory attributes as well, since these can lead to more uniqueness.
FPGuard Is a browser extension and instrumented Chromium browser [FZW15]. It
uses the breaking linkability and limiting exposure strategies. It also includes fingerprint-
ing detecting logic, that can be used to keep a blacklist of fingerprinters.
Blink Blink is a prototype solution that aims to break linkability by automatically
reconfiguring browser environments, including virtualized operating systems [LRB15]. It
does allow users to configure some elements that should be kept static for each session,
to increase usability. Blink uses the breaking linkability strategy.
PriVaricator PriVaricator is an enhancement of the Chromium private browsing
mode [NJL15]. It uses the breaking linkability strategy. It adds randomness to the
return values of some browser attributes.
FPRandom FPRandom is a modified version of Firefox [LBM17]. It aims to apply the
breaking linkability strategy by making the implementation of some browser functionality
less deterministic, while limiting the impact on the user experience. It mainly does this
by modifying some browser functions that do not have to be deterministic according
to the ECMAScript specification. This last point is a key difference with PriVaricator,
since PriVaricator also adds randomness to functions that should be deterministic.
Browser isolation systems Browser isolation systems isolate the browser environ-
ment from the system the end user is browsing on [Cro17]. The browser software is run
in a local sandboxed, virtualized environment or on a completely different system. We
believe it is plausible that these systems could be used to protect against fingerprinting
by making it easier to increase uniformity of browsers, if customization options of the
browsers are limited. This would be at the cost of usability, but we believe some or-
ganisations would and end users would prefer this option. A potential risk to selecting
one browser profile for all users of a particular organisation could be that it makes the
organisation’s web identity easy to fingerprint.
Brave Browser A Browser implementation based on the Chromium browser13. It in-
cludes protections against fingerprinting in the form of randomizing certain attributes14.




A collaborative strategy Gómez-Boix et al. pitched the idea of a collaborative strat-
egy for mitigating tracking through browser fingerprinting [Góm+19]. The browser fin-
gerprints of participants would be collected. Then a clustering algorithm is applied to
divide the participants in a predefined number of clusters. Each member of a particular
cluster then configures their browser the same way. The different clusters still allow
for differentiation of the configuration. As a result the impact on the usability for each
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Malicious content delivery via the
web
This section is intentionally kept relatively short, as its only goal is to give the reader
the knowledge required to understand the uses of honeyclients and other similar crawlers
in the context of malicious content delivery via the web. For a list of commonly known
countermeasures against malicious web content, we refer to Appendix A.
4.1 High level targeting paths
4.1.1 Waterhole
The attacker compromises a site that is frequently or mostly visited by the target audi-
ence. An example of this would be an attacker compromising a forum for Pokemon card
collectors, if the goal is to find collectors with high value cards. The name is derived
from waterholes animals tend to visit. An analogy can be made to a crocodile waiting
in the water for animals to become thirsty and coming to drink.
4.1.2 Malvertisement
Advertisers pay money to advertisement platforms or websites to host their ads. To
increase the value advertisers get for their money, many advertisement platforms allow
advertisers to choose who their ads are showed to by setting certain parameters. Possible
parameters include IP, browser, operating system, gender and social class, amongst oth-
ers1. If an attacker manages to get their malicious content delivered by an advertisement
network, they can use these specific targeting parameters as well.
1https://www.advertising.dpgmedia.be/en/advertise/digital/data-targeting
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4.2 Cloaking delivery flows
As mentioned earlier, website cloaking is a technique that enables websites to deliver
different content to different clients, with the goal of hiding particular content from
certain clients. Website cloaking is based on client detection, which is achieved via
browser fingerprinting. This browser fingerprinting can be done on the server, using
server technologies, or on the client, using JavaScript for example. Below we describe
four different strategies that can be used to deliver web content. Note that all of the
below strategies can be combined with a phased fingerprinting approach. Using such
an approach, the different fingerprint checks are done in separate phases. The first
server or script might check one fingerprintable attribute and then redirect to another
page or server, or deliver another fingerprinting script. This could then check another
fingerprintable attribute and do the same thing. The end result is that part of the
cloaking stack is cloaked as well, making potential investigations harder.
4.2.1 No cloaking
With no cloaking, the delivered content does not depend on the browser fingerprint. As
a result the same content is delivered to all visitors. The client submits a request for a
page, the server sends the content without applying any filtering.
Figure 4.1: No cloaking
Server-side cloaking In server-side cloaking, the cloaking logic is entirely on the
server. The client submits a request to the server, the server uses some of the details
of the request to determine whether it should send specific content or not. Examples of
this type of cloaking are the blocking of certain IP addresses or User-Agent strings from
seeing the cloaked content.
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Figure 4.2: Server-side cloaking
4.2.2 Client-side cloaking
In client-side cloaking, the cloaking logic is sent to the client and executed inside the
browser client, for example by using JavaScript. An example of this is a script that
checks if the user visited other pages before the requested one in this browser session
(tab) or not, before requesting the cloaked content.
Figure 4.3: Client side cloaking
4.2.3 Client-side cloaking with server side validation of results
In this case, client-side technologies such as JavaScript are used to gather certain browser
attributes, which are then sent back to the server. The server then uses that data to
decide whether it should sent the cloaked content or not.
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Figure 4.4: Client side cloaking – fingerprint information sent back to server
4.3 Generic targeting and bot detection techniques used
for cloaking
Below we provide a non exhaustive list of potential targeting techniques for cloaking
during malicious content delivery. The core of this list was built by combining techniques
mentioned in prior work, in particular the papers of Brendan Dolan-gavitt and Yacin
Nadji [DN10] and Zhang et al. [Zha+21]. A small set of other ideas was added based on
our own knowledge of honeyclients and browser fingerprinting. Finally, we also analyzed
the MDN Web API documentation2, to find other potentially interesting APIs to use
for cloaking purposes. We found one, Window.opener, of particular interest. For the
specifics, we refer to 4.3. We chose to focus on techniques that are commonly mentioned,
cover both properties and behavioural attributes, we also chose examples of newer and
deprecated techniques. We excluded potential techniques with particularly complex
implementations.
Please note that we also performed a specific review of the techniques mentioned by
Brendan Dolan-gavitt and Yacin Nadji [DN10] as part of this research. We believe this is
valuable due to the fact that the mentioned paper dates back to ten years ago, meaning
some of the techniques might not be relevant anymore. The results can be found in
Subsection 6.4.1.
Geolocation – IP based IP addresses can be linked to specific geographic locations,
like countries. In this check, the server validates that the request comes from an IP linked
to a specific country or set of countries. This way, attacks can be targeted towards users
likely originating in a specific set of countries, and analysis from crawlers or security
analysts from other countries is thwarted.
2https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API
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Referer The Refererer header indicates from which other url the current one was
called. As an example, the referer header is set to https://www.google.com/ when a user
clicks on a google search result to navigate to it. In this check, the server validates the
request includes the expected value for the referer header. Having this header set gives
the server some indication that the user performed certain actions to get to the page.
User-Agent “The User-Agent request header is a characteristic string that lets servers
and network peers identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of
the requesting user agent.” [Moze]. In this check, the server validates whether the User-
Agent header is set to an expected value. This is used to target specific browser family
versions for example.
Cookie The cookie headers are used to make a HTTP connection stateful. A cookie
could be set to indicate a specific page was visited for example. In this check, the server
validates that an expected cookie value is set. The malicious payload is only delivered
in case the user executed the necessary actions to set the required cookie value.
System date An attacker could assume that real users (humans) would make sure
their system time is relatively correct. This might not be the case for automated crawlers,
which might restore to a virtual machine image in between consecutive runs as well,
leading to an out of sync system time. In this check, the web application triggers the
client to send its system time to the server. The server then verifies if that time is not
significantly different from its own time. While we do not believe this test will be useful
in a lot of cases, it can still work as designed at the time of writing.
Immediate browser history Browsers keep track of which pages were visited during
a session, to enable going back and forward through those pages. The History web API
gives access to the number of entries in the history 3. In this check, the web application
triggers the client to send the history length to the server. The server then verifies if
that length is higher than a specified number. As a result, the malicious content is only
delivered for connections from a session that went through the expected number of pages
to get to the malicious web page.
Opener The Window.opener property contains a reference to the window that opened
the current window4. In this check, the web application triggers the client to send the
opener url to the server. The server then verifies if that value matches the expected
opener. This way, the server validates the new window was opened from a specific url.
User-Agent consistency check The User-Agent header can be easily spoofed by




Web API however5. If this value is not spoofed as well, it is fairly obvious the client is ly-
ing. In this check, the web application triggers the client to send the navigator.userAgent
value to the server. The server then verifies if that value matches the value provided
in the User-Agent request header. We note here that there are other ways to check if
the User-Agent is being spoofed. Since the User-Agent indicates which browser family
and version is used, the server could check for specific functionality or bugs only present
in the specific browser version. If it is not present, the server could also assume the
User-Agent is spoofed.
Mouse movement While the vast majority of human users probably performs mouse
movements when visiting a web page, this might not be the case for web crawlers. One
option for crawlers to counter this, is to trigger some random mouse movements after the
initial page load. In this check, the web application only triggers the malicious payload
if mouse movement is detected after a set timeframe. This would still block analysis by
crawlers that only simulate mouse movements during a smaller timeframe.
Captcha “A captcha is a program that can generate and grade tests that: (A) most
humans can pass, but (B) current computer programs can’t pass. Such a program can
be used to differentiate humans from computers.” [Ahn+03]. As per the definition,
captchas are specifically designed to differentiate humans from computers. If a captcha
is not complex enough, it can be bypassed however. In this check, the web application
uses a captcha and only delivers the malicious payload to clients that pass the test.
Alert The Window.alert Web API6 opens a window with a given text and waits until
the user clicks ok. Some crawlers might not have the functionality to perform this action.
In this check, the web application only delivers the malicious payload to clients that close
the alert. This test does require user interaction and could arouse suspicion.
Confirm The Window.confirm Web API7 opens a window with a given text and waits
until the user clicks ok or cancel. Some crawlers might not have the functionality to
perform this action or default to one of the two option. In this check, the web application
only delivers the malicious payload to clients that click the expected option. This test
does require user interaction and might arouse suspicion.
Notification The Notification.requestPermission Web API8 prompts the user for per-
mission to send notifications later on. It is fairly new with support only having been






The permissions API also plays a role in this process9. In this check, the web applica-
tion prompts the user for permission to send notifications and only delivers the malicious
payload to clients that grant permission. This filters out potential crawlers that do not
support Notification.requestPermission or default to rejecting the request.
Microphone and camera access The MediaDevices.getUserMedia Web API10 prompts
the user for access to the microphone and webcam, or one of those. Just like Notifica-
tion.requestPermission, it is fairly new with support only having been implemented in
certain browsers such as Chrome, Edge and Firefox in 2015 and 2016. The permissions
API also plays a role in this process11. In this check, the web application prompts the
user for permission to the webcam and microphone and only delivers the malicious pay-
load to clients that grant permission. This filters out potential crawlers that do not
support MediaDevices.getUserMedia or default to rejecting the request.
Presence of webcam (video input device) – without access granted The Medi-
aDevices.enumerateDevices Web API requests the list of media input and output devices
connected to the browser device. 12. In some browsers, this returns a list of device info
even if permission to access devices was not yet granted. In our control tests, both
chromium and firefox reported the presence of a webcam when it was connected, and
did not report a connected videoinput device when there was no webcam connected. In
this check, the server instructs the browser to only load the malicious content if a video
input device is detected. This test is still relevant at the time of writing, even though
it does require a different technical implementation than the usage of Flash, which was
mentioned by Brendan Dolan-Gavitt & Yacin Nadji [DN10].
Geo API location access The Geolocation.getCurrentPosition Web API13 prompts
the user for access to the location of the device. The permissions API also plays a role in
this process14. In this check, the web application prompts the user for permission to the
device location and only delivers the malicious payload to clients that grant permission.
This filters out potential crawlers that do not support Geolocation.getCurrentPosition
or default to rejecting the permission request.
The following techniques have been discussed in prior research, but we do not con-
sider them to be very relevant anymore or believe them to only be useful in specific








Window beforeunload “The beforeunload event is fired when the window, the doc-
ument and its resources are about to be unloaded. The document is still visible and the
event is still cancelable at this point” [Mozg]. In this check, the web application only de-
livers the malicious payload when this event is triggered and the client closes the related
popup in a predetermined time. However, the Mozilla Developer Network (MDN) docu-
mentation indicates that the conditions for this event to trigger are different depending
on the browser [Mozg], meaning you can not rely on it being triggered whenever the
web page is closed. In some browsers, the commands that can be run when this event is
triggered, are also limited. On top of that, triggering this event relies on the web page
managing to make the user close the window in the first place. Because of the above
limitations, we decided not to include this technique in this research. While technically
possible to implement, we believe that whether or not this test is relevant is debatable.
Connection speed In this check, the web application triggers a client-side check of
the connection speed and only delivers the payload if the client’s connection speed falls
in a certain range. The reasoning of this check is that organisations running security web
crawlers like honeyclients might have a significantly higher connection speed than normal
users [DN10]. We do not believe this is a reliable check, since even consumer grade
subscriptions offer 1Gbps connection speeds in certain countries [Tel]. organisations
might also throttle their speeds for single connections, to limit excessive bandwidth
usage by each browser client. As a result, we decided not to implement this technique
for this research. While technically possible to implement, we believe that whether or
not this test is relevant is debatable.
Plugins The netscape Plugin Application Programming Interface (NPAPI), and the
related Pepper Plugin API are used for the creation of browser plugins. There are ex-
isting JavaScript libraries such as PluginDetect [Ger] that detect installed plugins for
certain browser versions. In this check, the web application determines if certain plugins
are installed and only delivers the malicious payload in that case. The assumption is
that human users would have certain plugins or a certain amount of plugins installed.
However, all major browser vendors have removed support for NPAPI plugins in the last
six years [Mica][Mozc][Chrb]. One exception is Flash, which is no longer enabled or sup-
ported in the latest versions of browsers released in 2021 or is planned to be completely
removed later [Mozc][Chra]. Because of the above, we decided not to implement this
technique for this research. We believe this test is not as relevant anymore for modern
browsers.
Presence of speakers (audio output devices) – without access granted This
check is similar to that of presence of webcam, but detects audio output devices. The
control tests we performed to validate this technique led to inconsistent results however.
Presence of microphone (audio input devices) – without access granted This
check is similar to that of presence of webcam, but detects audio input devices. The
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control tests we performed to validate this technique led to inconsistent results however.
Browser history In 2006, Jeremiah Grossman published about a CSS hack allowing
a web application to detect if a client browser had visited a specified url in the past[Gro].
In this check, the web application verifies if the client has visited a given set of urls, and
only delivers the malicious payload if that is the case. Browsers have since continued
to include patches for such browser history leaks however [Mozb][Mozd]. While new
leaks have been discovered over time [Smi+18][Moza], we do not believe this is a reliable




Honeyclients are browser clients that are purposefully left vulnerable or that emulate
vulnerable browsers. They are the client equivalent of a so-called server honeypot [QH10;
QZ11]. A server that is left vulnerable on purpose to lure in attackers, thus distracting
and detecting them. The goal of a honeyclient is to detect webpages delivering malicious
code and as such are a potential counter to cloaking. One distinct difference between
the client honeypot and server honeypot techniques is that the use of a server honeypot
is a passive approach. A honeypot owner waits until an attacker falls into their trap.
When using a honeyclient however, the web is actively crawled. Usually some sort of
pre-filtering of web pages is done, to reduce the amount of pages that have to be visited
to those that are the most likely to be malicious. This reduces the amount of resources
used, which is necessary since crawling the entire internet is not feasible for most research
groups. Since there is an infinite amount of possible browser configurations, it is also
impossible to crawl all web pages with all possible browser configurations.
While traditional scrapers could probably be retrofitted to work as a honeyclients, we
note that to be of use, they would have to be modified to be able to act as a vulnerable
browser, and to perform automatic analysis of the crawled content to spot potential
malicious activity.
Prior research using honeyclients showed that the amount of existing exploit sites
was higher for older versions of a specific Windows version [Wan+05]. Existing research
mainly focused on describing particular honeyclients [IHF08; DS14; MWF14], honey-
client frameworks [QH10; OS10; PCS16], honeyclient usage strategies [QZ11; Kim+12]
or honeyclient analysis evasion [Kap+11].
5.1 Honeyclient types
In related literature, a distinction is made between two types of honeyclients. The
distinction between these two types is important to highlight as each type has its own
specific advantages and disadvantages, which also play a potentially important role in
the results of this research.
High-interaction honeyclients use real browsers on top of a specific operating
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system environment [QH10]. A master system controls the, usually virtualized slave
system, which is running the vulnerable browser. This slave system is used to visit
selected web pages. After a web page is visited, the state of the slave system is analyzed
to detect traces of potentially malicious activity. If this type of activity is detected,
the web page is considered to be malicious. High-interaction honeyclients contain all
functionality of a real browser. Using high-interaction honeyclients is very resource
intensive as a real system is needed for each browser configuration to be tested. A
second disadvantage of a high-interaction client is that since they are fully functional
systems that are designed to become compromised, there is a danger that an infection
of the slave system could lead to an infection of the master system in case the malware
is capable of doing so. In case of using a virtualized environment, the malware might
be able of breaking out of the guest host. A popular open source example of a high-
interaction honeyclient using virtualization is cuckoo sandbox.
Low-interaction honeyclients use emulated browsers. The functionality of differ-
ent browsers and browser versions is emulated, as well as their vulnerabilities [QH10].
One advantage of low-interaction honeyclinets is their lightweight footprint. Since it is
possible to emulate multiple browser configurations, only one real system is needed to
test a webpage using multiple configurations. A second advantage is that while they
emulate vulnerable functionality, they do not allow the actual exploitation of those vul-
nerabilities, thus leading to less chance of the test system becoming compromised. A
disadvantage of low-interaction honeyclients is their lack of full browser functionality,
making it easy to detect them. A popular open source example of a low-interaction
honeyclient is thug.
5.2 Built-in analysis and enrichment tools
Honeyclients do not just behave like vulnerable clients. They usually also include a
toolset to detect potentially suspicious behaviour, and log or store artifacts that could
be used by an analyst to investigate what happened while visiting a specific web page.
Two examples of this are Thug’s capability of submitting samples to VirusTotal and
logging the result, and its ability to also log potential tracking cookie information1.
Similarly, Lookyloo also performs specific analysis and shows the results. Aside from
the main use cases, it includes integrations with third party tools to perform additional
analysis. Examples of this are performing WHOIS lookups of domains and IPs found
during the Lookyloo analysis, as well as submitting samples to VirusTotal and providing





Analysis of the extent to which
security web crawlers can be
blocked by generic targeting and
bot detection techniques
6.1 Introduction
Security web crawlers, such as honeyclients, are used to analyze web pages with the
goal of detecting malicious behaviour. Cyber criminals on the other hand want to
prevent this detection from succeeding. One possibility to achieve this might be to
fingerprint individual security web crawlers, and to hide the malicious content if the
fingerprint is detected. This would potentially require analyzing each individual crawler
however. Doing so could be labour intensive, and in some cases, not practically feasible
though. Another option might be to implement more generic targeting and bot detection
techniques. Implementing such techniques could potentially prevent analysis by a whole
set of tools, without the need to individually fingerprint each, leading to a high benefit
at a fairly low cost. In this part of the research we focus on such techniques, as they
could be considered the low hanging fruit. Specifically, we analyze the extent to which
security web crawlers can be blocked by generic targeting and bot detection techniques.
6.2 Methodology
This section provides a more in depth overview of the research methods and data that
were used to reach the final contributions as well as the design decisions that were made
while developing this part of the research. The books ’Designing a Research Project –
Second edition’ [VD10] and ’Onderzoeksvaardigheden’ [NVV18] were used as reference
for a theoretical background in how to create a research plan for this and all other
methodologies. The authors of the former describe five possible research strategies. For
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each contribution, the different potential research strategies are discussed and the reasons
for choosing particular ones are given. Grounded theory is not a valid research strategy
for any of the contributions in this research, as none of them has developing a theory
as a goal. This leaves the following research strategies to discuss: survey, experiment,
case study and desk research. For all desk research, Hugo Jonker’s approach to finding
literature1 will be used. This approach consists of searching for key terms, performing
a second selection to filter out sources that are not relevant and then snowballing by
looking at citations, authors and venues related to previously selected articles.
Possible research strategies for this part of the research are described below.
• Survey A survey is more tailored for analysis in breadth rather than in depth
analysis, as a result it is not a suitable approach for this contribution.
• Experiment A quasi-experimental approach is ideal for this contribution and in
particular to verify whether certain modifications to generic targeting and bot
detection tools, for example adding or removing particular functionality, lead to
changes in the efficacy with which selected popular honeyclients avoid detection by
generic bot detection techniques. Performing such modifications is only possible
in case the research team has access to the source code of the tool. Having an
implementation of a set of generic targeting and bot detection techniques is a
requirement to be able to perform these experiments. As it seems there is no open
source example of such an implementation, this will have to be created.
• Case study A comparative case study can be used to compare different security
web crawlers. In particular, security web crawlers could be used to attempt to
access a particular page which has a specific, generic bot detection technique,
protecting it. A security web crawlers would be tested this way against a selected
set of generic targeting and bot detection techniques. These results can then be
compared.
• Desk research A desk research research method can not be used to create new
empirical data, but it could be used to discover generic targeting and bot detection
techniques described in prior research. Those detection techniques could then
potentially be implemented. Desk research can also be used to determine potential
countermeasures and improvements for security web crawlers. This can also be
useful in situations where creating a specific implementation is not feasible within
the scope of this research, due to time or resource constraints.
The chosen research methods for this part of the research are experiment, compara-
tive case study and desk research. Two open-source honeyclients have been selected and
installed for testing. The first is Thug [Thub], an open-source low-interaction honey-
client under active development. The second is Cuckoo Sandbox [Sana], an open-source
high-interaction honeyclient. Note that according to a notice published on Cuckoo Sand-
box’ github page [Sanb], Cuckoo Sandbox 2.x is currently unmaintained as a full rewrite
1https://www.open.ou.nl/hjo/writing/literature.htm
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of cuckoo is ongoing. In addition, a cloud-based honeyclient-like analysis services was
chosen as well. Lookyloo [Loo] is an open source project which has a public instance
running at https://lookyloo.circl.lu/. “Lookyloo is a web interface that captures a
webpage and then displays a tree of the domains, that call each other.” The last crawler
chosen for this part of the research is VirusTotal [Virb]. VirusTotal is a well-known
tool in the IT security community. When a file or url is submitted to VirusTotal, it
is inspected by a large set of antivirus scanners and URL/domain blocklisting services
[Vira]. The analysis results are returned to the submitter.
In the initial phase, a set of generic targeting and bot detection techniques were
chosen and presented. This set was be created by combining techniques specified or
mentioned in multiple academic papers, with potentially new techniques found by ana-
lyzing the Mozilla Developer Network Web APIs documentation [Mozf]. In this phase,
we also reviewed particular techniques mentioned by Brendan Dolan-Gavitt & Yacin
Nadji [DN10].
In a second phase, the chosen techniques were implemented in a new web application
that can be used for testing. The implementation was validated manually by simulating
the different connection scenarios. We note here that the application includes explana-
tions of how a specific technique works on each page. While this does not contribute to
the main research question that is being tackled with this part of the research, it could
potentially be useful in spreading awareness of cloaking usage later on. As such, this
contribution could also play a role for RQ2, which relates to the awareness of cyber secu-
rity professionals about this topic. Having a concrete implementation allows a teacher or
presenter to use the concreteness fading teaching strategy. With this strategy, a concept
is presented with gradually increasing levels of abstraction. This has been proven to be
an effective teaching strategy [Fyf+14].
In the third phase, we tested the chosen crawlers using the implemented web appli-
cations.
6.3 Implementation
In this subsection we present the design decisions made when creating the web applica-
tion implementation of the techniques mentioned above.
6.3.1 Choice of generic targeting and bot detection techniques
The techniques mentioned and that we deemed to still be relevant in Section 4.3 formed
the basis of our web application. We chose to focus on techniques that are commonly
mentioned, cover both properties and behavioural attributes and provide both examples
of newer and deprecated techniques. The full list of implemented techniques can be
found below.






• Immediate browser history
• Opener
• User-Agent consistency check
• Fingerprint using fingerprintjs. FingerprintJS offers an open source [Fin] as well
as a professional [fA], commercial version of a browser fingerprinting API. While
determining the fingerprintability of particular security web crawlers is not the
main goal of this part of the research, we still find it interesting to include this
particular functionality in the test web application. The reason for that is twofold.
Firstly, it does give us some indication of the fingerprintability of each crawler
and secondly, it gives us a concrete example of fingerprintability to show during






• Microphone and camera access
• Presence of webcam (video input device) – without access granted
• Geo API location access
6.3.2 Web application implementation
We chose the Django Python web framework2 for the implementation of the web appli-
cation. Django is inspired by the model-view-controller (MVC)3 architecture. It does
have a slightly different architecture however, called model, template, view (MTV). The
Django framework was chosen because it is written in Python, one of top five most
popular programming languages [OGr]. Another reason is the fact that Django follows
the MVC architecture, which should make the developed web application fairly easy to




be run in two modes. In eicar mode, a download of the anti malware testfile EICAR is
triggered4. In the other mode, a specific picture with a danger sign is displayed instead.
The code is stored on github at https://github.com/Wachizungu/cloakingDemoSite.
The site is currently run at https://cloaking.jeroenpinoy.website/cloakingsite/.
It is hosted with NGINX and apache.
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, the navigation menu was divided in three sub menus,
client side – browser state, client side – browser behaviour and Server side – browser
state. This is mainly for convenience. The names of the menus also indicate whether the
check is performed entirely on the server or if there is also a client side component. We
do not make the distinction between browser, user and system attributes in the menu
names here. This would have been a possibility as well. The choice is mostly a design
decision.
Figure 6.1: Cloaking website navbar
Where possible, we reused existing libraries and Django apps to avoid mistakes by
re-implementing already available functionality, and to reduce workload. We used the
latest version of the popular bootstrap CSS and jQuery as well. The IP location mapping
is done using the Maxmind free geolocation data5.
For two of the techniques mentioned earlier, we decided to include several variations.
For confirm, we included one test that expects the user to click ok and another one
that expects the user to click cancel. An attacker can tell a user which response they
expect, so a crawler should test both options. We also included a third, custom confirm-
like prompt using sweetalert2 [Swe]. The reason is that the default confirm window
is limited and doesn’t allow you to change the text for the responses. An attacker is
not limited to using the default either, the potential lack of support in targeted browser
version for the custom JavaScript code might be a concern to them however. Screenshots




similar fashion, we implemented three separate captcha pages. Two requiring human
interaction, the Django simple captcha [con] app and Google reCAPTCHA v2 [Goo].
The final one, Google reCAPTCHA v3 does not require human interaction, instead, it
sends a score back to the server. The score indicates how likely it is that the client is
human. Screenshots of the simple captcha and reCAPTCHA v2 can be found in Figure
6.3 and 6.4. While reCAPTCHA v3 does not require interaction, it is not completely
transparent to the user. A small widget, as seen in Figure 6.4, is automatically added
on the page containing it.
(a) regular (b) sweetalert2
Figure 6.2: Confirm window
Figure 6.3: Simple Captcha
(a) reCAPTCHA v2 (b) reCAPTCHA v3
Figure 6.4: Google reCAPTCHA
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6.4 Results
6.4.1 Review of See No Evil: Evasions in HoneyMonkey Systems
In Table 6.1, we present the results of our review of the techniques mentioned in “See





Alert This test is still relevant at the time of writing, it does require user
interaction and might arouse suspicion however.
Camera As mentioned in Subsection 4.3, this test is still relevant at the
time of writing, even though it does require a different technical
implementation than the one mentioned by Brendan Dolan-Gavitt
& Yacin Nadji [DN10].
CAPTCHA This test is still relevant at the time of writing. There are
multiple options to implement a CAPTCHA, including Google’s
reCAPTCHA.
Connection Speed As discussed in Subsection 4.3, while technically possible to im-
plement, we believe that whether or not this test is relevant is
debatable.
Browser History As discussed in Subsection 4.3, we believe this test is not relevant
anymore for modern browsers.
Date We call this technique System date. While we do not believe this
test will be useful in a lot of cases, it can still work as designed at
the time of writing.
Immediate History We call this technique Immediate browser history. This test is still
relevant at the time of writing, the functionality used is still available
today.
Message Box We call this technique Confirm. This test is still relevant at the
time of writing, it does require user interaction and might arouse
suspicion however.
Microphone Called Presence of microphone (audio input devices) – without ac-
cess granted by us, this check is similar to that of presence of we-
bcam, but detects audio input devices. The control tests we per-
formed to validate this technique led to inconsistent results however.
We note that this check is still possible by requesting microphone
access however, in that case it does require user interaction and
might arouse suspicion however.
onMouseMove We call this technique Mouse movement. This test is still relevant
at the time of writing and the related functionality has not changed.
onBeforeUnload We call this technique Window beforeunload. As discussed in Sub-
section 4.3, we believe this technique is unreliable.
Plugins As discussed in Subsection 4.3, we believe this technique is not as
relevant anymore for modern browsers.
Referrer This test is still relevant at the time of writing, the functionality of
the Referer header has not changed.
Table 6.1: Our review of attacker techniques mentioned by [DN10]
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6.4.2 Lookyloo results
Lookyloo provides a web interface that allows you to trigger a crawl of a webpage, which
then analyses which other urls are redirected to or called and displays the results in a
graphical user interface [Loo]. Lookyloo can be used by cyber security professionals to
investigate a webpage to determine if it is performing suspicious activities. An example
of a Lookyloo analysis result page can be seen in Figure 6.5. Lookyloo does not manage
to handle the eicar download, as can be seen in the following analysis result: https://
lookyloo.circl.lu/tree/366d23f1-680d-407b-9930-0107ca287a9a. Lookyloo anal-
ysis results include a screenshot of the page however. As a result, the tests were carried
using the bad picture mode.
Figure 6.5: Lookyloo analysis result
Lookyloo managed to trigger the malicious content delivery for the referer, user-
agent, alert, confirm – expect cancel and cookie tests. Passing the referer, geolocation –
IP based and cookie tests requires using specific configuration parameters when executing
the analysis.
The used Lookyloo instance was fingerprintable using FingerprintJS. Subsequent
visits, even with a different User-Agent, led to the same visitor ID and thus, more
benign content was provided on the second and third visits.
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6.4.3 Thug results
Thug is an open source low interaction honeyclient [Thub]. Depending on the configu-
ration, it logs analysis results to files or to a MongoDB6 instance. Thug also includes
functionality to take a screenshot at the end of the analysis [Thua]. After the execu-
tion of our control test with the test web application in eicar mode, we found that the
following query can be used on the database to determine if the malicious content was
successfully triggered.
db.behaviors.find({description: /.*44d88612fea8a8f36de82e1278abb02f.*/})
Thug only managed to trigger the payload in two of our test scenarios. The first
being referer, the second geolocation – IP based. For many of the other scenarios, the
following error was displayed.
[handle_events] Event onload not properly handled
We opened a discussion on the Thug project Github repository to ask if this was
expected behaviour or a known issue7. The core developer of Thug confirmed there is
indeed an issue, according to him Thug is not able to handle bootstrap v5 at the time of
writing. This issue is considered to be low priority by the core developer of Thug since
bootstrap v5 officially dropped support for IE 10 and 11. We redid our tests without
bootstrap v5. Even then, Thug only managed to trigger the payload in the two test
scenarios mentioned before: referer and geolocation – IP based.
6.4.4 VirusTotal results
VirusTotal (VT) is a well-known tool in the IT security community. When a file or
url is submitted to VirusTotal, it is inspected by a large set of antivirus scanners and
URL/domain blocklisting services [Vira]. The analysis results are returned to the submit-
ter. An example of a VirusTotal url analysis result page can be seen in Figure 6.6. Virus-
Total analysis is a sort of black box, as the inner workings are not clear from the outside.
The results can change over time as the tools or reputation engines used are updated.
Surprisingly, the results for all of our main test pages were “No security vendors flagged
this URL as malicious”. The control test with the eicar download url gives “2 security
vendors flagged this URL as malicious” at the time of writing, which is low. This is es-
pecially strange considering the fact the analysis at https://www.virustotal.com/gui/
url/bf2664ff2c75022faa70a24bef3af86e04b87b5227e00ea49fb3bc66d58b7ef9/details
does provide the resulting SHA-256 hash of eicar, which is:
275a021bbfb6489e54d471899f7db9d1663fc695ec2fe2a2c4538aabf651fd0f
Entering this hash in VirusTotal gives “62 security vendors flagged this file as malicious”




Figure 6.6: VirusTotal analysis result
6.4.5 Cuckoo Sandbox results
Cuckoo Sandbox is an open source malware sandbox [Sana], which can also serve as a
high interaction honeyclient.
We installed Cuckoo on an Ubuntu host, with a Windows 7 ultimate guest system.
We chose Windows 7 because the Cuckoo Sandbox documentation lists it as one of the
recommended operating systems for the guest system guest8. We installed the latest
available version of Internet Explorer 11 and Mozilla Firefox on the system. Our control
tests showed that Mozilla Firefox was not executed by Cuckoo Sandbox properly. We
then rolled back the Firefox version to version 65. This version is orchestrated properly
by Cuckoo Sandbox. We ran all our tests with Cuckoo sandbox using both Internet
Explorer 11 and Mozilla Firefox 65. We also enabled the simulate human interaction
mode of Cuckoo Sandbox when executing our tests.
Internet Explorer 11 Cuckoo Sandbox managed to trigger the malicious payload for
the alert, confirm – expect cancel and mouse movement tests. We believe it should also
be possible to pass the geolocation – IP based check, since Cuckoo Sandbox has an option
to set a specific network route or vpn to use for a specific analysis. Unfortunately, we
were unable to set up the routing rules to test this within the scope of this research due
to time limitations. Interestingly, Cuckoo Sandbox fails for some tests which Lookyloo
and Thug can pass. This is mainly because of the lack of configuration options that
allow you to set the Referer header for example.
8https://cuckoo.readthedocs.io/en/latest/installation/guest/creation/
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Mozilla Firefox 65 Cuckoo Sandbox managed to trigger the malicious payload for
the date and mouse movement tests. Interestingly, there are differences when compared
to our runs with Internet Explorer 11. This seems to be due to a lack of support for
some of our web application’s functionality in Internet Explorer 11, and a lack of support
of some of the simulate human interaction mode for Mozilla Firefox. Our guest system
running Firefox was fingerprintable using FingerprintJS. Subsequent visits, even with
a different User-Agent, led to the same visitor ID and thus, more benign content was
provided on the second and third visits.
6.4.6 Summary of all crawler results
We present a summary of our findings in Table 6.2. A
√
in the table indicates that the
crawler managed to trigger the malicious content. A X means the crawler did not manage
to trigger the malicious content. A ? indicates that we believe the crawler should be able
to trigger the payload if specific configuration is used, but which we did not manage to
test.
The FingerprintJS technique is a special case. Ideally, a crawler should not be
fingerprintable. Crawlers that were specifically fingerprintable using FingerprintJS are
indicated by
√
/X. The other crawlers never managed to trigger the malicious payload
on the FingerprintJS check, not even on the first pass.
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X X X X
Cookie
√
X X X X
System date X X X X
√
Immediate browser history X X X X X
Opener X X X X X
User-Agent consistency X X X X X
FingerprintJS
√
/X1 X X X
√
/X1
Mouse movement X X X
√ √
CAPTCHAs
Simple captcha X X X X X
reCAPTCHA v2 X X X X X













Confirm: sweetalert2 X X X X X
Microphone and camera access X X X X X
Notification X X X X X
Presence of webcam X X X X X
Geo API location access X X X X X
√
success: malicious content triggered
(note that the crawlers are trying to acquire the malware for analysis)
X failed: malicious content withheld
? failed, should be possible to pass with proper configuration, which we were not able to test.
1 First visit receives malicious content, subsequent visits do not.
Table 6.2: Summary of security crawler test results
6.4.7 Proposals for improvement
Generic Most of the tested crawlers lack support for newer technologies such as the
notification API, or even the latest browser versions. This results in failing tests across
the board. Implementing support for newer technologies or browser versions could im-
prove results. We do note however that focusing on older browser versions makes sense,
since they are more likely to have known vulnerabilities and thus are probably targeted
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more often by attackers. Having configurable parameters for certain browser attributes
such as Referer header or cookies can also improve results.
Lookyloo Potential improvements are support for newer technologies such as the no-
tification API and a configuration parameter to click ok instead of cancel when asked to
confirm.
Thug Improved support for newer technologies such as the notification API or boot-
strap v5. Another potential improvement is the inclusion of a configuration parameter
to provide cookies to use when connecting to the url to analyze.
VirusTotal A potential improvement is clarification of how the URL analysis works.
Additionally, some content analysis could be triggered for visited urls. The possibility
to request a screenshot of the analyzed url would be a nice addition as well.
Cuckoo Sandbox Cuckoo Sandbox lacks analysis parameters to set certain values
such as the Referer header or User-Agent header. Adding these could potentially be
achieved by using extensions for the installed browsers and creating a custom analysis
module. Implementing support for newer operating system and browser versions would
be an improvement as well. Finally, we believe it should be possible to add more human
interaction simulation and if possible, provide parameters for them. One example could
be that instead of clicking cancel on a confirm prompt, the user of Cuckoo Sandbox has
the option to configure Cuckoo to click ok.
6.5 Discussion
Some of the results are as expected, with Cuckoo Sandbox managing to simulate certain
human interactions, specifically mouse movement, while low interaction honeyclients
failed to do so. Many of the results were surprising however, we expected these crawlers
to perform better overall. The fact that VirusTotal did not report any pages as suspi-
cious is a disappointment as well, considering the popularity of the service among cyber
security professionals.
These results can be used to determine potential areas of improvement. They also
serve as a good reminder that you can’t rely on tools like this to guarantee that a web
page is not malicious.
One interesting avenue for future research with security web crawlers, could be the
usage of other crawlers like OpenWPM, used in fingerprinting related research, to de-
velop a honeyclient capable of more human like interaction. Combining the malware
analysis functionality of an open source tool like Cuckoo Sandbox, with the more ex-
tensive crawling capabilities of OpenWPM, might lead to a system capable of bypassing
more advanced cloaking techniques.
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Part III
An analysis of the awareness and
preparedness of cyber security





A survey performed amongst IT leaders of European organisations in 2017, showed that
cyber security was one of their top 5 concerns [Kap+19]. In some cases, having certain
security controls in place is mandated by a supervisor or certifying body. This is often
the case for banks and payment processors. Examples of required compliancy are the
payment card industry data security standard (PCI-DSS)1 and the Society for World-
wide Interbank Financial Telecommunication’s Customer Security Programme (CSP)2.
Considering the increased reliance of organisations on IT infrastructure to perform their
business activity, it is now in their best interests to have an organisation wide cyber
security strategy. As part of an organisation’s cyber strategy, a computer security inci-
dent response team (CSIRT) can be founded. Carnegie Mellon University published a
whitepaper discussing services that can be offered by such a CSIRT 3. Relevant services
include incident handling, security-related information dissemination, configuration and
maintenance of security tools, risk analysis, awareness building, education/training and
business continuity and disaster recovery planning.
We argue that to offer these particular services, awareness of attacker’s tactics and
techniques is vital. Spreading knowledge of this type can be done using shared online
repositories. An example of this is the frequently used MITRE ATT&CK® framework.
MITRE ATT&CK® is a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary tactics and
techniques based on real-world observations [MITb]. The ATT&CK knowledge base is
used as a foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies in
the private sector, in government, and in the cybersecurity product and service commu-
nity [MITb]. We noted that while browser fingerprinting is a known attack pattern to
MITRE [MITa], it is not part of the ATT&CK knowledge base and related tactics such
as reconnaissance, initial access and defense evasion, as well as related techniques such
as drive-by-compromise and masquerading do not mention it. This fact, combined with
experiences of the researchers, led to the hypothesis that awareness of this technique as






Below, we state the research questions related to this part:
• RQ2-1 How aware are cyber security professionals and their organisations of cloak-
ing techniques?
• RQ2-2 How prepared are organisations for dealing with malicious web content
delivery attacks using cloaking techniques?
• RQ2-3 What additional steps can organisations take to improve awareness and
preparedness to deal with malicious web content delivery attacks using cloaking
techniques?
To answer these questions, we combine three main research strategies. We start by
performing a case study of two cyber threat intelligence sharing communities, which use
MISP as a sharing platform. We follow this up with a survey of cyber security profes-
sionals. The results of both are then compared and combined. Desk research is used as
a supporting research strategy, to gain the necessary knowledge with regards to prior
knowledge and MISP, and to formulate an answer to RQ2-3 by discussing countermea-




This section provides a more in depth overview of the research methods and data that
were used to reach the final contributions as well as the design decisions that were made
while developing this part of the research. For more information about which resources
were used to create the below section, please refer to 6.2.
Possible research strategies for this part of the research are described below.
• Survey A survey could be used to gauge the awareness of cyber security pro-
fessionals with regards to cloaking techniques. Without limiting the scope, this
approach would take too much time. Even if only US commercial banks were tar-
geted, 12,000 organisations would have to be contacted [FDI]. If this strategy is
chosen, the scope should be limited.
• Experiment While it is technically possible to perform attacks against a random
set of European financial institutions and assess their performance. This would
be against the law in case these institutions did not provide permission. It seems
unlikely that permission to perform these types of exercises at financial institutions
is often granted and even if it is, it could possibly take a long time for the appro-
priate approvals to be granted and proper agreements signed. For this reason, the
research team believes it is unreasonable to assume this type of experiment can be
performed, even at a small group of institutions, within the time frame allocated
for this research.
• Case study A case study of a specific organisation is not a suitable research
strategy for this contribution, for reasons similar to those mentioned under the
experiment section. A case study of MISP communities based on data in selected
community instances, is possible however. By analysing the built in capabili-
ties of MISP for contextualisation of threat intelligence data, as well as the data
shared within those communities, we can potentially draw conclusions with regards
to research question 3 and in particular RQ2-1. If there are structured ways of
indicating the usage of browser fingerprinting techniques during attacks, or this
information was added in an unstructured way to data, this means there is at least
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some awareness of these techniques amongst cyber professionals. Having a struc-
tured, simple way to share threat intelligence with regards to incidents including
cloaking, can also contribute to being prepared to deal with them. As a result,
this study could also aid in responding to RQ2-2.
• Desk research To our knowledge there is no prior research about the topic of RQ2-
1. Another possibility is to search documentation of shared online repositories for
threat intelligence related information. An example is the MITRE ATT&CK®
framework mentioned earlier. The options for the desk research strategy with
regards to this particular research question are limited, a simple analysis of this
repository was already done prior to starting our more in depth research as well.
This strategy can play an important role when determining the answer to RQ2-
2 and RQ2-3 however, since prior research potentially analysed countermeasures
against cloaking. Note that papers with regards to countermeasures of browser
fingerprinting and cloaking were already reviewed in scope of the earlier sections
of this research.
The main research strategies for this contribution will be a case study and sur-
vey, complemented with desk research. Combining the case study and survey strategy
should allow for comparison and triangulation. Triangulation in this context is the us-
age of different methods to study a particular phenomenon, resulting in a broader and
more correct view [Run+09]. A survey will be sent to a select group of organisations
from different sectors the author has a connection to. This survey will serve as initial
exploratory research with a fairly limited target group. Follow up research could be per-
formed later using the same or an updated set of questions. Cyber security professionals
are targeted as the research question directly relates to them. The survey questions will
be based on desk research and the outcome of the case study of MISP communities.
These questions will be reviewed and tested by a selected small group of participants at
the author’s institution first, before sending them to other participants.
Data collection for this contribution will be done via the selected MISP communities,
and a by the student university’s approved web based survey tool, Limesurvey. The
survey will be added as addendum to this report.
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Chapter 9
Case study: Analysis of MISP
communities
We refer back to research question 3 and its secondary questions:
• RQ2: How aware and prepared are cyber security professionals and their or-
ganisations when it comes to cloaking attacks, and how can their awareness and
preparedness be improved?
• RQ2-1: How aware are cyber security professionals and their organisations of
cloaking techniques?
• RQ2-2: How prepared are organisations for dealing with malicious web content
delivery attacks using cloaking techniques?
• RQ2-3: What additional steps can organisations take to improve awareness and
preparedness to deal with malicious web content delivery attacks using cloaking
techniques?
The goal of this case study is to contribute to answering RQ2. To this end we will
examine contextualisation capabilities in an open source threat intelligence platform with
a large user base in the security community: the MISP platform. We will also analyze
the data shared within the two case study communities, to determine if data with regards
to cloaking incidents is shared. If there are structured ways of indicating the usage of
browser fingerprinting techniques during attacks, or this information was added in an
unstructured way to data, there is at least some awareness of these techniques amongst
cyber professionals. Having a structured, simple way to share threat intelligence with
regards to incidents including cloaking, can also contribute to being prepared to deal with
them. Threat intelligence platforms such as MISP allow collaboration on investigations,
sharing of indicators that could be used to enhance protections and creating human
readable reports for analysts and managers. If organisation A found a webpage that
seems to be spreading malicious content using cloaking, they can create an event in a
MISP community, add whatever information they have and share it. Other organisations
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can then take action based on this information, for example by blocking connections to
the malicious web page or performing extra analysis of the page themselves. They can
then potentially share back their findings to the community as well. Use cases such as
this lead us to believe organisations actively using these tools in such a way could be
considered more prepared. As a result, this study could also aid in responding to RQ2-2
and RQ2-3.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first explain what MISP and MISP communities
are, as well as how contextualisation can be added in MISP and how this contextual-
isation can be searched. We then present the results of our analysis and discuss these
results.
9.1 MISP and MISP communities
MISP is an open source threat intelligence platform for sharing, storing and analysing
indicators of compromise (IOCs) such as IP addresses, malware samples, financial fraud
information or even human readable reports. MISP was originally an acronym for ’Mal-
ware Information Sharing Project’. MISP has evolved into an generic purpose intelli-
gence sharing platform however. As a result, MISP is now just called MISP. The core
developers of MISP are working for the Computer Incident Response Center Luxem-
bourg (CIRCL), CIRCL is a governmental organisation and is the computer emergency
response team (CERT) for the private sector in Luxembourg.
MISP also allows users to build MISP communities. A MISP community is composed
of the local organisations on a MISP server and the remote organisations connected by
the sync users. MISP has a community-based distribution scheme, using community
distributions is the recommended way of using MISP. A graphical presentation of how
this distribution works can be seen in Figure 9.1. All main data can be flagged for
a particular distribution. The available distributions are your organisation only, this
community only, connected communities, all communities or a sharing group. Sharing
groups on the other hand allow you to specify a specific group of organisations and
instances to share data with. Due to the complexity of this mechanism, using it is only
recommended for use cases where community distribution can not be used. In simple
words, a MISP community can be seen as a group of users and organisations, sharing
and creating cyber threat intelligence with one another in a collaborative manner.
A subset of the default MISP communities list mentioned in the platform [MISa],
showing that MISP communities cover a diverse range of topics and members, can be
found below :
• MISPPRIV CIRCL Private Sector Information Sharing Community
• CIRCL financial information sharing community
• X-ISAC sharing community X-ISAC (pronounced cross-ISAC) is the support-
ing Information Sharing and Analysis Center for other ISACs, information sharing
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communities or CSIRT networks which provides core software, cross-sector threat
intelligence, taxonomies and open standards.
• COVID-19 MISP community A community for tracking both health and cyber
threat related information around COVID-19
The MISP communities in scope of the case study are the MISPPRIV and COVID-19
MISP community. We chose to only include these to keep the scope withing reasonable
bounds. Most of the other communities also have particular requirements to join, making
it more complicated for researchers to get access to them.
Figure 9.1: MISP community sharing overview, image from the public MISP documen-
tation [MISb]
9.2 Contextualisation in MISP
The MISP platform allows users to automate several business processes. Data in it
becomes more valuable as better metadata or contextualisation is added. A relevant
selection of MISP’s defined user stories, available in the public MISP documentation at
[Prob], can be found below in Table 9.2:
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User story
As a cybersecurity specialist, I want to investigate threats so that I can remediate
and prevent cyber attacks
As a SOC analyst, I want to share real-time information pertaining to new or ex-
isting cases/observables to team members so that we can collaborate on investigations
simultaneously
As a lead threat intelligence analyst, I want to convert threat data into actionable
threat intelligence so that I can improve security posture.
As a risk analyst, I want to identify and predict risks to my organisation so that I
can improve the organisation’s security posture and situational awareness
As a risk analyst, I want to present risk data to stakeholders in various formats
(depending on their technical ability), so that I can justify the need for risk-mitigating
strategies
As a security analyst, I want to automate repetitive tasks related to data normal-
ization, importation, aggregation and enrichment so that I can have more time to put
into threat analysis efforts
Table 9.1: Relevant MISP user stories [Prob]
Note that all of these use cases are relevant to analysis and risk management of threats
such as the ones posed by the potential use of cloaking techniques. Adding metadata
in a structured way is necessary for all of the processes related to these use cases to
work smoothly and correctly. For example, organisation B could automatically trigger
analysis with a honeyclient on potentially malicious web pages. Organisation A might
have mentioned that the page uses cloaking and only delivers the malicious content
to Belgian IP addresses, but added this information in an unstructured way. Unless
organisation B’s honeyclient happens to use a Belgian IP address, the honeyclient will
not receive the malicious content. If the same information was added in a structured
way, organisation B could use it and choose an appropriate proxy to run its honeyclient
analysis of the webpage. Having metadata added in a structured way also helps for our
research use case, as will become clear later.
Since one of the goals of this case study is to determine whether cyber security pro-
fessionals are aware of cloaking techniques, and this type of information is usually added
as metadata, it is necessary to understand the tools MISP provides for contextualisation
and how to search through that data. There are currently six different ways of adding
generic metadata or contextualisation to the event data in a MISP. This section gives an
overview of those six. While there are other ways of adding contextualisation, those are
used to add specific information such as an indication of whether an attribute is likely
a false positive. As such, they are not particularly relevant for this research.
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9.2.1 Taxonomies and tags
Tags are simple labels that can be added to MISP data such as events and attributes.
They can be managed in a structured or unstructured way. The unstructured way is
creating separate custom tags on a MISP instance and then subsequently using these.
In the example below you can see an example of this. The suspicious tag was created
as a separate tag and then added to an attribute.
Figure 9.2: MISP tagged attribute
The structured approach to tagging is grouping tags in taxonomies. The MISP
project already has a set of taxonomies that can be enabled by users. It is also possible to
create custom taxonomies using a simple json structured file. An example of a taxonomy
can be found below.
Figure 9.3: MISP tlp taxonomy
9.2.2 Galaxies
A MISP galaxy is a simple, structured method to express a set of metadata called a
cluster that can be attached to MISP events or attributes. Galaxies allow you to add
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a group of linked metadata with just one action, making it easier to provide context,
with that context being readily available for access by other analysts as well. In the
screenshots below you can find an example of a galaxy cluster and the usage of such a
cluster in a MISP event. In the example, the threat actor Lazarus Group cluster was
added, indicating the event can be linked to this group. The entry in the MISP event
can be hovered over to get extra information.
Figure 9.4: MISP galaxy
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Figure 9.5: MISP event with galaxy
9.2.3 Object relationships
Object relationships allow you to name a relationship between two objects or an object
and an attribute. A simple example can be found below. This example shows a file that
connects to a specific ip1.
Figure 9.6: MISP object relationship
9.2.4 Object and attribute comments
It is also possible to add simple comments to attributes and objects, as can be seen
below. Again, an example is provided below. The comment field is a free text field and
1https://github.com/MISP/misp-objects/blob/main/relationships/definition.json
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leads to unstructured data as a result.
Figure 9.7: MISP attribute with a comment
9.2.5 Comment and text attributes
It is also possible to add comment or text attributes to an event. Comment and text
attributes are free text and lead to unstructured data as a result.
Figure 9.8: MISP comment attribute
9.2.6 Event reports
Event reports are a fairly new functionality. They are intended to duplicate the infor-
mation available in an event, presenting it in a more human-readable form. Analysts
can use markdown to write these reports and link to event data in them. Event reports
behave the same way as event attributes when sharing with others [Proa].
9.3 Searching through MISP contextualisation
The index and detail pages of taxonomies, events and event reports are particularly
useful for browsing through the data and performing an in depth review.
String based searches can be performed fairly easily on all types of contextualisation
mentioned above. The following specific methods were identified:
• GUI based search functionalities, in particular the event search and event report
search. The former allows you to do string based searches for events. Accord-
ing to the documentation2, the searchall parameter works in the following way:
“Search for a full or a substring (delimited by % for substrings) in the event info,
event tags, attribute tags, attribute values or attribute comment fields.” Unfor-
tunately, the event search with searchall parameter does not match for values in
event reports. This is understandable however, searching through event reports
can severely impact performance and if best practices are followed, the data con-
tained in the event report should also have been added to the event in other ways,
for example in the form of attributes and objects.
2https://www.circl.lu/doc/misp/automation/
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• REST API based search, in particular the /events/restSearch API. The results
returned when using the searchall parameter are essentially the same as on the
above mentioned GUI based string search for events.
• Extracting the event data in a specific format such as json and then performing
data processing on the extract.
• SQL queries using the database. The MISP database schema can be found in the
MISP github repository3. This gives you direct access to the full data, allowing
for more granular searches, including on potentially soft-deleted data.
• In the case of galaxies and taxonomies, string searches can also be done using the
github search functionality in the respective git repositories45, this can not always
be relied on due to github not searching certain files if they are too large. An
alternative could be cloning the git repository and performing string searching on
the files.
9.4 Results
We gained access to two MISP communities, MISPPRIV and COVID-19 MISP. The
data in the respective community instances was pulled in to two separate local MISP
instances by executing a pull sync with a local user.
Different search strategies were used for specific types of MISP data. In some cases,
DB queries were executed directly. This potentially leads to different results as when
using MISP functionality, since deleted or archived entries might not be returned by
MISP in certain scenarios. We argue that this difference is not of significant importance,
unless no results are found at all. This is because our goal is to determine whether
analysts are aware of browser fingerprinting techniques and if so, whether they add
contextualisation in a structured way when mentioning its use. We argue that if any
results are found, there is at least some awareness within the community.
9.4.1 Default MISP taxonomies
String searches for the terms fingerprint, browser and cloaking were performed on the
MISP project taxonomies repository, which contains the default MISP taxonomies6, us-
ing a locally cloned copy of commit e4930e6c0eb80e8d6d8adbd021ece77c35d5ca35. The
following relevant results were found. The fingerprint tag from the cycat taxonomy,
which has the following description: “Code to uniquely identify specific cybersecurity-






hassh, jarm or favicon-mmh3.”7. In the maec-malware-capabilities taxonomy, which is
based on the MAEC 5 specification8, the following tags were found:
• compare-host-fingerprints “Compares a previously computed host fingerprint to
one computed for the current system on which the malware instance is executing,
to determine if the malware instance is still executing on the same system.”
• fingerprint-host “Creates a unique fingerprint for the system on which the mal-
ware instance is executing, e.g., based on the applications that are installed on the
system.”
• environment-awareness “Indicates that the malware instance or family can fin-
gerprint or otherwise identify the environment in which it is executing, for the
purpose of altering its behavior based on this environment.”
This result leads to a first observation: There are existing default taxonomy tags
that when used, could indicate usage of cloaking. These tags lack granularity however.
They can be used for many types of fingerprinting. As a result it is not possible to
automatically determine whether they are related to an attack involving cloaking as
defined in this research or not.
9.4.2 Galaxies
String searches for the terms fingerprint, browser and cloaking were performed on the
MISP project galaxy repository9, which contains the default MISP galaxies, using a
locally cloned copy of commit 6c8949caa920296b8d6d10065d9521d3e33bf185.
The only relevant hits not related to specific tools or attacker groups are the dep-
recated Unconditional client-side exploitation/Injected Website/Driveby – PRE-T1149
entry from the mitre-pre-attack-attack-pattern cluster and Drive-by Compromise from
the mitre-ics-techniques cluster. There are several other MITRE related attack tech-
niques that can be performed using browser fingerprinting, but they are not specific
enough.
The tool cluster includes an entry for RICECURRY with the following description:
“RICECURRY is a Javascript based profiler used to fingerprint a victim’s web browser
and deliver malicious code in return. Browser, operating system, and Adobe Flash ver-
sion are detected by RICECURRY, which may be a modified version of PluginDetect.”.
We note that the latest version of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, released end of
April 202110 has a newly defined technique that is very similar to cloaking as defined in
this research called Drive-by Target11. The emphasis in their description is on detecting







no specific mention of using fingerprinting to actively avoid detection by researchers or
analysts. This version has now been integrated with MISP but was not yet part of the
platform when we performed our full analysis.
This result leads to a similar observation as for taxonomies: There are several ex-
isting default galaxy clusters that when used, could indicate usage of cloaking. These
clusters still lack some granularity however. The most specific one is the Drive-by Target
technique from the MITRE Attack Pattern galaxy, but it does not necessarily indicate
detection evasion using cloaking
Keeping track of adoption of usage of this new galaxy cluster in MISP communities,
could be interesting follow up research.
9.4.3 Object relationships
The default MISP object relationships are defined in the misp-objects repository on
github12.
We performed searches for the terms fingerprint, browser and cloaking on the file.
This was followed up by a manual review of the different relationships. Potentially
relevant relanship types are properties-queried and properties-queried-by. The following
SQL query was run to determine which relationship types were used in each community.
SELECT distinct relationship_type from object_references
INTO OUTFILE ’/tmp/relationship_types.csv’
FIELDS TERMINATED BY ’,’
ENCLOSED BY ’"’
LINES TERMINATED BY ’\n’;
The results for both the COVID-19 and MISPPRIV communities are displayed in
Appendix B. None of the relationship types are likely to be related to browser finger-
printing.
9.4.4 Tags
For this analysis, the tags were exported to json for future reference. After that, string
searches for the terms fingerprint, browser and cloaking were performed on the MISP
instance on which the data was imported. In a final phase the researcher manually
reviewed all tags and checked whether the name could be a synonym for browser fin-
gerprinting. In both MISP communities, a subset of the tags were actually galaxy tags.
We decided to include them in the analysis anyway as they might have been created for
custom galaxies that are not part of the default MISP galaxies. In that case, these tags
would not have been found in the generic galaxies analysis described earlier.
COVID-19 MISP At the time of the analysis, 705 tags were used in the COVID-19
MISP. None of these, except for the the cycat fingerprint tag, have a reasonable chance
to potentially be related to browser fingerprinting.
12https://github.com/MISP/misp-objects/blob/main/relationships/definition.json
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MISPPRIV At the time of the analysis, 3,294 tags were used in the COVID-19 MISP.
None of these, except for the the cycat fingerprint tag, have a reasonable chance to
potentially be related to browser fingerprinting.
While there are no tags that directly indicate browser fingerprinting was used, there
are some tags that are more likely to be added in situations where browser fingerprinting
might have happened as well, exploit kit is an example of this. Nevertheless, this result
indicates that no tags and galaxy clusters directly related to browser fingerprinting, were
used in these MISP communities.
9.4.5 Objects, attributes, event info
For this analysis, the restSearch API was used, with variations of the following request
for the strings fingerprint, browser and cloaking.
curl \
-d ’{"returnFormat":"json","searchall":"%cloaking%"}’ \
-H "Authorization: [API_KEY]" \
-H "Accept: application/json" \
-H "Content-type: application/json" \
-X POST https://localhost/attributes/restSearch
COVID-19 MISP The search for cloaking yielded no results. The searches for fin-
gerprint and browser had 91 and 111 hits for attributes, but none of the attributes or
related events were clearly linked to browser fingerprinting.
MISPPRIV There were 2 hits for cloaking, neither are related to browser fingerprint-
ing.
There were 876 attribute hits for fingerprint and 734 attribute hits for browser. The
relevant results are presented below. We always include the event UUID and the content
of the event info field.
59f01bb9-c1f8-487f-8bee-3adfac12042b2, Diskcoder.D/BadRabbit Outbreak
String matches for %fingerprint% on several ip-dst attributes with comment Victim
fingerprinting and malware delivery. The following is mentioned in a linked report 13:
“Before the actual malicious file was downloaded a POST request was observed to a static
IP address (185.149.120[.]3). This request was found to be posting to a static path of
”/scholasgoogle” and provided the user agent, referring site, cookie, and domain name of
the session. After the POST the dropper was downloaded from two different paths from
1dnscontrol[.]com, /index.php and /flash install.php.” The event also contains four ip-
dst attributes with comment “Victim fingerprinting and malware delivery”
13https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/bad-rabbit.html
68
54c2050d-cc18-4fa5-b6e2-45bf950d210b, OSINT – The Waterbug attack group
String matches for %fingerprint% on several hostname attributes with comment Used
for fingerprinting. The following is mentioned in a linked report 14: “However, unlike
traditional watering-hole attacks, where all visitors to a particular website are targeted
indiscriminately, in the case of the Venom network used by the Waterbug group, the
attackers use a more deliberate approach. This is done in a multi-staged fashion by
firstly redirecting visitors to another malicious server. On the malicious server, a fin-
gerprinting script is executed and this extracts configuration information from the user’s
computer related to installed bowser plugins (Adobe Reader, Silverlight, Java, Flash etc.).
The attackers also collect basic system and network information, such operating system
version, type, browser version, and internet protocol (IP) address. At this point, the at-
tackers have enough information to determine if the visitor is of further interest. When
an IP address of interest is identified, such as one associated with a government institu-
tion, they proceed to create a rule specific to that IP address. This rule ensures that the
next time the visitor arrives on the compromised website their computer may be sent a
malicious payload instead of just being fingerprinted.”
564a5a82-8aa0-419f-b8c4-4a17950d210b, OSINT Pinpointing Targets: Ex-
ploiting Web Analytics to Ensnare Victims – WitchCoven by FireEye String
match for both %fingerprint% and %browser% on an md5 attribute which has the fol-
lowing text as a contextual comment: “JavaScript file to fingerprint browser and plugins,
then redirect to”. Aside from that, a comment attribute in the event contains the follow-
ing text: “The script contains the jQuery JavaScript library that is obfuscated to remove
variable names. The full script is quite lengthy but is largely comprised of identical or
slightly modified versions of publicly available scripts, including evercookie, PluginDetect
and the detect Office module from the Browser Exploitation Framework Project.”.
5be9c820-b558-4494-a96e-4a4d0a021402, OSINT: Sensitive Data Exposure
via Battery Information Broadcasts in Android OS [CVE-2018-15835] String
match for both %fingerprint% and %browser% on a text attribute, with the following
relevant content: “System broadcasts by the Android operating system expose detailed
information about the battery. Prior research has demonstrated that same charging in-
formation – when exposed via browser battery status API – can be used to uniquely
identify and track users.”.
5c461015-56a4-40e0-a12a-1f540a021402, OSINT: Fallout Exploit Kit now in-
cludes exploit for CVE-2018-15982 Flash zero-day String match for both %fingerprint%
and %browser% on a text attribute, with the following relevant content: “ Experts at
Malwarebytes observed a new version of the Fallout Exploit kit that include the code to
exploit a recently discovered Flash zero-day vulnerability. The Fallout Exploit kit was
discovered at the end of August by the threat analyst nao sec, at the time it was used to
14https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/waterbug-attack-group
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distribute the GandCrab ransomware and other malicious codes, including droppers and
potentially unwanted programs (PUPs). First detailed in September 2018, the toolkit
was observed delivering malware families ranging from ransomware to backdoors, but
also fingerprinting the browser profile to identify targets of interest.”
5c3f64cc-d508-4afd-9b6e-43e30a021402, OSINT: New Magecart Attack De-
livered Through Compromised Advertising Supply Chain String match for
both %fingerprint% and %browser% on a text attribute, with the following relevant
content: “Part of its fingerprinting routine includes checking if the script is running on
a mobile device (by checking the browser User-Agent) and if there are handlers that check
if the browser debugger is on. The fingerprinting routines are done to confirm that the
browser session is from an actual consumer.”
5ee7402e-22b8-4409-9675-546dac13a7a7, Earth Empusa Uses Phishing At-
tacks to Deploy New ActionSpy Malware String match for %browser% on a
comment attribute, with the following relevant content: “First is the injection in the
ScanBox framework to collect information from a website’s visitors by using JavaScript
to record keypresses and harvest the profiles of the OS, browser, and browser plugins
from the client environment.”
57e95d7a-c1a4-4ca2-8e79-e730646d1a36, Phishing – Browser Reconnaissance
String match for %browser% on a comment attribute, with the following relevant content:
“Sends user to savethechildren[.]org if the browser does not meet certain criteria.”
56ca3897-a370-42f8-9899-4bb19062e56a, WitchCoven: Exploiting Web Ana-
lytics to Ensnare Victims String match for %browser% on a url attribute pointing
to https://panopticlick.eff.org/browser-uniqueness.pdf, note that was likely a reference
to a research paper. The event also references an external analysis report from FireEye,
describing a browser profiling script they called witchcoven15
15https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt-witchcoven.pdf
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Table 9.2: Relevant events based on string searches
9.4.6 Event reports
String searches for the terms fingerprint, browser and cloaking were performed using the
eventReports search functionality of the MISP GUI.
COVID-19 MISP At the time of the analysis, the COVID-19 MISP community did
not have any event reports.
MISPPRIV Three hits were returned when searching for browser, but none of those
had content related to browser fingerprinting.
9.5 Discussion
We have seen that multiple events in the MISPPRIV MISP community had data related
to usage of cloaking techniques. This indicates that at least some members of this
community were aware of these techniques. Based on the above results, the answer
to RQ2-1 is that there is at least some awareness of browser fingerprinting techniques
amongst security professionals. Nevertheless, the amount of events found is fairly limited.
We also found multiple structured methods for contextualisation, in particular object
relationships, taxonomy tags and galaxy clusters, that could be used to indicate usage
of cloaking. We consider none of the existing object relationships, taxonomy tags or
galaxy clusters to be granular enough to indicate usage of certain cloaking techniques
however. We consider it likely that a more structured method would have been added
if the awareness of these techniques were higher. The user stories mentioned earlier
are all hindered by the lack of structured contextualization methods for incidents using
cloaking:
As a cybersecurity specialist, I want to investigate threats so that I
can remediate and prevent cyber attacks If I want to perform such an
investigation into cloaking as a cybersecurity specialist, I need to sift through
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a lot of potentially unrelated information, because I can not easily search for
events or attributes due to a lack of granularity in the contextualisation
options, and the ways in which other analysts entered their data.
As a SOC analyst, I want to share real-time information pertain-
ing to new or existing cases/observables to team members so that
we can collaborate on investigations simultaneously Effective collab-
oration during a new or existing case relies on a common understanding of
certain concepts and terminology.
As a lead threat intelligence analyst, I want to convert threat data
into actionable threat intelligence so that I can improve security
posture. This is similar to the previous user story. If I want to perform such
a conversion as a threat intelligence analyst specialist, I might not be able to
determine proper actions due to a lack of granularity in the contextualisation
added.
As a risk analyst, I want to identify and predict risks to my organ-
isation so that I can improve the organisation’s security posture
and situational awareness As a risk analyst, I could use trend analysis
or general statistics to determine how frequently cloaking is used and if this
frequency is increasing. This could be an input for my risk assessment or
something to report to management. The lack of decent, granular contextu-
alisation makes this a lot more cumbersome though.
As a risk analyst, I want to present risk data to stakeholders in
various formats (depending on their technical ability), so that I
can justify the need for risk-mitigating strategies The issue here is
essentially the same as for the previous user story.
As a security analyst, I want to automate repetitive tasks related
to data normalization, importation, aggregation and enrichment
so that I can have more time to put into threat analysis efforts
Automated enrichment of bad urls could be influenced by having a tag or
cluster for browser fingerprinting. For example, if something is tagged with
’browser-fingerprinting:detection-evasion’ and PAP allows it, we could make
MISP trigger enrichment using services that have anti-cloaking, such as us-
ing spoofed browser profiles, multiple machines with significantly different
setups, or even just different IPs. Again, due to the lack of structured con-
textualisation for browser-fingerprinting, this is not currently possible in a
simple way.
Before continuing, we repeat the main research questions related to this part of the
research:
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• RQ2: How aware and prepared are cyber security professionals and their or-
ganisations when it comes to cloaking attacks, and how can their awareness and
preparedness be improved?
• RQ2-1: How aware are cyber security professionals and their organisations of
cloaking techniques?
• RQ2-2: How prepared are organisations for dealing with malicious web content
delivery attacks using cloaking techniques?
• RQ2-3: What additional steps can organisations take to improve awareness and
preparedness to deal with malicious web content delivery attacks using cloaking
techniques?
All of the above cases raise the question of how good the data quality of the data in
our MISP communities is. For browser fingerprinting this seems to be low. According
to the Data Management Association International (DAMA) UK, there are six main
data quality dimensions: Completeness, uniqueness, timeliness, validity, accuracy and
consistency [Ask+13]. We noted that the proper use of some of the above structured
techniques to add contextualisation, could lead to higher data quality. This clearly has
advantages when attempting to analyse or use the data. Using structured methods of
adding metadata likely improves the consistency of the data. Using galaxies adds to
completeness as more related information is automatically linked. Aside from the tools
for contextualisation, other functionality of a threat intelligence tool such as MISP also
directly helps in maintaining data quality. Having built in deduplication of events can
improve uniqueness of data entries for example. Finally, the analyst still has a big
responsibility in making sure the data quality is high. In the end, it is the analysts job
to make sure data is entered completely, accurately, in a timely manner and using the
best practices.
Using a tool such as MISP also likely contributes in being prepared to deal with
attacks, including those using browser fingerprinting. A first example use case is the
collaboration during an incident. Multiple analysts can investigate the same incident
or similar incidents at the same time and share information about those incidents with
each other in a structured way. A second example is the automation of repetitive tasks.
A url attribute having a tag mentioning it is using location based cloaking and targeting
users from Belgium, might trigger an automated analysis using a Belgian proxy. This
is relevant for RQ2-2, although we note that the lack of a good, granular, structured
contextualisation option for browser fingerprinting makes MISP less effective for this
than it could be. We argue that improving these contextualisation options would benefit
the preparedness of organisation to deal with cloaking attacks. As such, this result also
relates to RQ2-3.
Follow up research that could be done is using the /events/restSearch endpoint to
search the event info field. We believe this is unlikely to give much extra hits however,
as we expect that events related to cloaking would also contain attributes mentioning it.
Nevertheless, we already ran the relevant queries and have the data ready for analysis.
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In a similar vein, it is possible there are other search terms we are unaware of, which
might be used as synonym to cloaking. It is perhaps possible to review events one by
one for potentially relevant data. This would be very time consuming however. Finally,
keeping track of adoption of the new Drive-by Target MITRE galaxy cluster in MISP
communities, could be interesting follow up research as well.
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Chapter 10
Survey of cyber security
professionals
10.1 Survey design
The books ’The art of asking questions’ [Pay51], ’Onderzoeksvaardigheden’ [NVV18]
and ’Fragebugen’ [Por14] were used as reference for a theoretical background in how to
create a survey design.
The variables of the relevant research questions are cyber security professionals,
organisations, awareness of cloaking techniques and preparedness to defend against drive-
by-download attacks using cloaking. Note that drive-by-download is slightly different
from the term malicious web content delivery we used in earlier parts of this research.
When preparing this survey, we focused on drive-by-download attacks. In a drive-by-
download attack, a malicious payload is delivered and executed on an unsuspecting user’s
system, while they are browsing the web in a normal way. After executing this survey, we
broadened the scope of our research to also include other types of malicious web content
delivery such as phishing content on phishing sites. For our survey, we translated the
aforementioned variables to the following components:
• Cyber security professionals
– Years of cyber security related experience
– Current job role





– Size (in terms of employees)
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– Age (how long the organisation exists)
• Awareness of cloaking techniques
– Knowledge of a situation or fact
– Perception of a situation or fact
• Preparedness to deal with drive-by download attacks using cloaking
– Implemented defenses
– Usage of strategies to investigate drive-by download attacks
– Collection of threat intelligence
All three of the sources mentioned earlier indicate that for gathering information and
determining awareness, open questions are the best option. As a result, open questions
and matrices were used for this purpose. To measure the preparedness of organisations
to deal with drive-by download attacks using cloaking, a combination of open ques-
tions and multiple choice questions was added. For perception of cloaking techniques,
inspiration was gained from the structure of the quintamensional design mentioned by
Payne [Pay51], we combined open knowledge questions, an attitude question, a reason-
why question and an intensity question. To limit the influence of provided information,
knowledge questions are asked first and participants can not go back to change their
answers. The questions are also split into several pages so specific topics are mentioned
one by one. In some cases, we deliberately forced a respondent to provide an answer
other than I don’t know. No questions related to the contextualisation of threat intel-
ligence were asked as this does not directly relate to the research questions and we did
not want to overload the respondents with too many questions. While we did do our
best to use simple wording, the nature of the research questions is such that specific
terms had to be used. Since the target group is cyber security professionals, we also
preferred using well-known cyber industry lingo. A specific concern for the survey was
the potential unwillingness of participants to share the name of their organisation and
their personal details. While being able to group responses by organisation is of ma-
jor importance for this research, we did not want to force respondents to provide this.
For this reason, we added a specific question to ask respondents if they are willing to
provide this information. If they indicated they were, the name was subsequently asked
for. Survey results were anonymized otherwise, meaning it is impossible for us to link
specific responses to individuals. The welcome page of the survey contains generic in-
formation about the research team and contact information. The final page thanks the
respondents and repeats contact information. A final comments question was added to
give respondents the possibility to mention comments or concerns about the subject of
the survey or the survey itself. The survey questions were tested with two candidates
and modified afterwards based on feedback. The final version of the survey can be found
in Appendix D.
Potential survey respondents were contacted via different channels.
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10.2 Results
10.2.1 Background of respondents & general statistics
35 fully completed surveys were collected from respondents from at least 6 different
organisations. 15 respondents were unwilling to provide the name of their organisation.
It is likely at least some of those belonged to different organisations than the 6 mentioned
by others. For most of the 6 organisations, the amount of respondents is very low. This
means it is not possible to draw conclusions per organisation in a statistically significant
way. Potential respondents were contacted either directly by the author of this thesis, or
by a contact of the author that was willing to ask other people working as cyber security
specialist at the contact’s organisation. The vast majority (96.67%) of respondents for
which the organisation size was known, worked for an organisation with more than 250
employees. The same can be said for the age of the organisations, with (96.67%) of
the respondents for which the organisation age was known working for an organisation
that has existed for at least 10 years. As can be seen in Figure 10.1, the respondents
were distributed among the public, semi-public, private and not-for-profit sectors fairly
equally. With a slightly lower representation of the semi-public sector. Figure 10.2 shows
that most of the respondents indicated they work in the Finance & Insurance industry.
Different experience levels are represented as well, as can be seen in Figure 10.4. The
bulk of the respondents were members of the blue team, as shown in Figure 10.3.





Table 10.1: Sector the respondents work in
Industry Amount of respondents % of respondents
Finance & Insurance 24 68.6%
Telecommunications 9 25.7%
Government & Public Administration 1 2.9%
Education 6 17.1%
Table 10.2: Industry the respondents work in
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Role Amount of respondents % of respondents
cyber analyst (blue team) 22 62.86%
red team member 3 8.57%
IT security manager (middle management) 3 8.57%
chief information security officer (CISO) 1 2.86%
security system engineer 1 2.86%
security researcher/analyst 1 2.86%
cyber threat intelligence analyst 1 2.86%
security architect 1 2.86%
systems manager 1 2.86%
Table 10.3: Current job roles of the respondents
Experience Amount of respondents % of respondents
0-2 years 10 28.57%
3-5 years 10 28.57%
6-10 years 8 22.86%
>10 years 7 20.00%
Table 10.4: Years of experience in cyber security of the respondents
10.2.2 Awareness of cloaking (targeting techniques)
When asked about potential targeting techniques, the vast majority of respondents failed
to mention any techniques that are used when performing cloaking on the web. This can
be seen in 10.5. About 20% of the respondents do mention some sort of generic browser
fingerprinting techniques and 11.43% mention IP based targeting. Most of the other
techniques mentioned rely on other services: ads, e-mail, compromising a site that the
targets tend to visit (waterhole attack). When asked How should an analyst investigate
a drive-by compromise attack to account for potential defense evasion techniques used
during the drive-by compromise?, none of the investigation techniques mentioned are
specifically designed to detect cloaking, see Figure 10.6. Finally, only 8.57% of respon-
dents heard or read about a successful drive-by compromise attack that was performed
in the last two years, which used some sort detection evasion other than vulnerability
detection (cloaking).
Based on all of the above results, we consider the awareness of cloaking (targeting
techniques) to be very low.
78
Targeting technique Number of mentions % of respondents
Waterhole attack 11 31.43%
Generic browser fingerprinting 7 20.00%
Create a site that is likely to attract target audience 6 17.14%
Use ad (networks) and their targeting options 5 14.29%
IP based (verify connecting IP belongs to target) 4 11.43%
E-mail / phishing via e-mail 3 8.57%
Language or country 3 8.57%
Target specific vulnerabilities 1 2.86%
Table 10.5: Targeting techniques mentioned
Investigation technique for attack which potentially uses cloaking
Monitor log files (network, servers,. . . )
Forensic analysis of impacted system
Anomaly detection (network flows,...)
Table 10.6: Mentioned investigation techniques for attacks which potentially use cloaking
10.2.3 Perceived risk of malicious web content delivery attacks using
cloaking techniques compared to attacks not using cloaking
We asked survey respondents for an assessment of the likelihood and impact of a drive-
by-target attack against their organization using specific techniques. This allows us to
calculate a perceived risk score (likelihood x risk). The possible answers for each question
ranged from 0 to 4. For likelihood the possible answers were 0 – not likely at all, 1 –
low likelihood, 2 – medium likelihood, 3 – high likelihood, 4 – very high likelihood. For
impact the possible answers were 0 – no impact, 1 – low impact, 2 – medium impact,
3 – high impact, 4 – very high impact. In the survey we made a distinction between
vulnerability scanning for targeting and other defense evasion techniques. While both of
these are targeting techniques for cloaking, we believe checking if the browser should have
the specific vulnerability an exploit would work for, the bare minimum for an attacker
to implement. Other defense evasion techniques in this case means mean any other
targeting techniques used for cloaking such as targeting clients from certain countries.
As can be seen in Table 10.7, the perceived risk is higher for attacks using more
advanced cloaking techniques (usage of vulnerability scanning and other defense evasion
techniques). However, even for this case the risk is still lower than high, which would
be 9 (3 x 3). Some respondents noted that it is hard for them to judge how likely such
attacks are to happen, partly due to a lack of awareness around this topic. Others did
not see a reason for a difference in impact based on the use of cloaking.
A more granular overview of the perceived likelihood, impact and risk, can be found
in Figures 10.1, 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4. Unfortunately, due to the fact that many respon-
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dents did not give extensive motivations for their choices and the somewhat random
distribution of the results, it is hard to draw specific conclusions based on these results.
no other defense evasion other defense evasion
no vuln. scanning 3.43 4.65
vuln. scanning 4.96 6.24
Table 10.7: Perceived risk
(a) likelihood (b) impact (c) risk
Figure 10.1: Perceived likelihood, impact and risk for drive-by-download attacks using
no vulnerability scanning and no other defense evasion techniques
(a) likelihood (b) impact (c) risk
Figure 10.2: Perceived likelihood, impact and risk for drive-by-download attacks using
vulnerability scanning and no other defense evasion techniques
We believe this question should also be asked in future surveys. If the perceived risk
is very low, the interest of organizations to implement controls against these techniques
will be low as well. The outcome of our survey gives some indication that organizations
would have some interest in this topic.
10.2.4 Preparedness for dealing with malicious web content delivery
attacks using cloaking techniques
When asked for defenses against drive-by-compromise attacks, none of the respondents
gave a response that can clearly be considered a defense against attacks using cloaking.
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(a) likelihood (b) impact (c) risk
Figure 10.3: Perceived likelihood, impact and risk for drive-by-download attacks using
no vulnerability scanning and other defense evasion techniques
(a) likelihood (b) impact (c) risk
Figure 10.4: Perceived likelihood, impact and risk for drive-by-download attacks using
vulnerability scanning and other defense evasion techniques
That doesn’t mean the mentioned defenses aren’t effective of course, since the controls
mentioned are designed to protect against generic drive-by-compromise attacks. The
consolidated answers can be found in Figure 10.8. When asked about how a poten-
tial drive-by-compromise attack should be investigated, the respondents also mentioned
some clear techniques to investigate potential drive-by-compromise attacks, see Figure
10.11. The majority of the respondents indicated their organisation implemented sev-
eral of the defenses against drive-by-compromise we mentioned ourselves, see Figure
10.9. Additionally, the amount of respondents that indicated their organisation uses
anti-browser-fingerprinting strategies is very low, as can be seen in Figure 10.10. Lastly,
18 out of the 35 respondents, or 51.43%, say they think their organisation should imple-
ment additional defensive strategies against drive-by-compromise attacks. This number
is significantly lower for the organisation with the highest number of respondents how-
ever, at 36.71%.
Based on all of the above results, we consider the preparedness of organisations to deal
with drive-by-compromise attacks to be considerable. There is still room for improve-
ment however, especially when it comes to implementing anti-fingerprinting strategies.
We note that browser isolation should be a fairly effective strategy to limit the potential
impact of a compromise. Depending on the solution used, it can also make it harder to
fingerprint individual individual users’ browsers or even organisations’ browsers, since
the browsers can be made uniform and potentially be shared between organisations if
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browser isolation as a service is used.
Defense technique Number of mentions % of respondents
Use proxy server with filter and content analysis 12 34.29%
Browser isolation 11 31.43%
Fast patching 11 31.43%
Blacklist known bad urls/domains 9 25.71%
User awareness training 6 17.14%
Restrict web content (adblock, javascript) 5 14.29%
Use endpoint detection tools 5 14.29%
Use intrusion detection system 4 11.43%
Use antivirus software on endpoints 3 8.57%
Use threat intelligence 3 8.57%
Least/low privilege on devices 2 5.71%
Use threat hunting 1 2.86%
Apply zero trust policy / strategy 1 2.86%
Table 10.8: Mentioned potential defense techniques for drive-by-compromise attacks
Defense technique Number of mentions % of respondents
Browser isolation 22 62.86%
Antivirus on systems 30 85.71%
Regular patching of browser software 29 82.86%
Disabling javascript 7 20.00%
Web proxy with category based filter 29 82.86%
Web proxy with content analysis 21 60.00%
Table 10.9: Implemented defense techniques against drive-by-compromise attacks
Defense technique Number of mentions % of respondents
Uniform browser fingerprint 3 8.57%
Randomized browser fingerprint 4 11.43%
Anti-fingerprinting browser extension 3 8.57%
Table 10.10: Implemented defense techniques against fingerprinting
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Investigation technique Number of mentions % of respondents
Investigate log data (network, proxy, Firewall) 14 40.00%
Perform forensic analysis of impacted system 7 20.00%
Analyze the malicious website 6 17.14%
IOC based search on network 2 5.71%
Anomaly detection in network traffic 2 5.71%
Use crawlers to analyze malicious website 2 5.71%
Determine scope of the compromise 1 2.86%
Isolate compromised system 1 2.86%
Table 10.11: Mentioned investigation techniques for drive-by-compromise attacks
10.2.5 MITRE ATT&CK® drive-by target
MITRE introduced the Drive-by Target technique to the ATT&CK® framework fairly
recently (March 2021) [MITc]. We believe the naming of techniques is important and
found the name of this technique confusing considering the description. We added a
question to our survey to determine if our respondents would provide a definition that
matches the one given by MITRE, when given the name drive-by target. Only 1 out of
35 respondents (that is, 2.86%), provided a definition that is remotely similar to that
of MITRE ATT&CK. This strengthens our belief that the name or description of this
technique should change in the future.
10.3 Discussion
Our survey results indicate that the awareness of cloaking techniques among cyber se-
curity professionals is fairly low. Nevertheless, the preparedness of the respondents’
organisations is considerable. We would recommend organisations to look at specific
defensive strategies like the ones mentioned in Appendix A, and to perform a risk anal-
ysis to determine if the effort required to implement them is worth it. Unfortunately, a
lack of awareness and tooling support we discovered in our research, makes it harder to
assess the risk, since it is not possible to easily create complete, consolidated reports of
the prevalence of cloaking attacks on organisations.
Our survey has clear limitations. The amount of respondents is limited. For some
organisations there are only a few respondents and almost half of the respondents were
not willing to indicate which organisation they work for, making it impossible to have
significant results grouped by organisation.
83
Chapter 11
Comparison of results and
discussion
In this chapter, we compare the results of the prior two sections and discuss potential
future research.
11.1 Comparison of results
The results of both the MISP community analysis and survey indicate that while there is
certainly awareness of cloaking among cyber security professionals, the overall awareness
of these techniques is fairly limited. Improvements could be made by providing user
awareness training, sharing more information with regards to cloaking techniques in
MISP haring communities and adding structured contextualisation options for cloaking
related metadata in MISP.
The results with regards to RQ2-2 and RQ2-3 are complementary. While the survey
results indicate that organisations are fairly well prepared to deal with malicious web
pages, there is room for improvement there as well, especially when it comes to investi-
gating these attacks and countering fingerprinting. Adding structured contextualisation
options for cloaking related metadata in MISP could potentially help with that to some
extent. Other blue team tools, such as browser isolation, can be implemented as well.
11.2 Discussion
Future research could include designing and performing a red team exercise involving a
cloaking attack at a set of organisations. This would be a true test of the preparedness
of those organisation and would lead to a more concrete assessment. Finding willing
participants could be a hindrance however.
An extension of the survey would increase the validity of the research as well. One
of the limitations is that we can not guarantee respondents did not fill in the survey
multiple times or that they did not use external resources while answering the questions.
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Performing the survey in an offline, exam type setting, would lead to more valid results.




Concerns for forensic analysis
when investigating a potential
compromise as a result of
malicious web content delivery
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Chapter 12
Analysis of differences in browser
cache forensic artifacts on usage
of Cache-Control: no-store header
Considering the arms race between attackers and defenders, thinking about countermea-
sures and analysis techniques also makes us reflect about ways in which attackers could
react to those countermeasures. Our final research question handles other concerns with
regards to investigating a potential compromise as a result of malicious web content
delivery.
RQ3 What other techniques can attackers use to thwart analysis of malicious web
content delivery attacks?
One of the actions that blue team members can take after a potential attack using
cloaking, is performing forensic analysis of the device on which the browser was running.
During usage of a device, traces of the activities performed on it are often left on disk
and in memory. There are three particular artifacts of interest in this case. The browser
history, cache and cookies. The browser history lists pages visited, the cache is used
to store re-usable files and cookies are used to make HTTP connections stateful. The
browser cache is intended to speed up the loading of web pages and to reduce bandwidth
usage. If allowed, a browser stores a version of received content for potential future use.
When the same content is requested again, the browser either serves the stored version,
or requests a new version from the server, based on several rules. This presents an oppor-
tunity to investigators. If the malicious content was cached, it can be retrieved from the
device and analyzed. An attacker can potentially counter this however. The proposed
HTTP 1.1 caching standard, RFC 2616 [IET], includes the Cache-Control mechanism
directive no-store. The purpose is explained in the RFC [IET] and can be found below.
“The purpose of the no-store directive is to prevent the inadvertent release or re-
tention of sensitive information (for example, on backup tapes). The no-store directive
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applies to the entire message, and MAY be sent either in a response or in a request.
If sent in a request, a cache MUST NOT store any part of either this request or any
response to it. If sent in a response, a cache MUST NOT store any part of either this
response or the request that elicited it. This directive applies to both non- shared and
shared caches. ”MUST NOT store” in this context means that the cache MUST NOT
intentionally store the information in non-volatile storage, and MUST make a best-effort
attempt to remove the information from volatile storage as promptly as possible after for-
warding it. Even when this directive is associated with a response, users might explicitly
store such a response outside of the caching system (e.g., with a ”Save As” dialog). His-
tory buffers MAY store such responses as part of their normal operation.”
In effect, an attacker might consider adding the header Cache-Control: no-store
header when delivering malicious content. If browsers follow the standard, this will
prevent them from storing a local copy in the cache, complicating the work of a security
analyst. In this part of the research, we present an analysis of browser cache forensic
artifacts on usage of Cache-Control: no-store header, to determine if there are truly
differences when the header is set. With this research, we contribute to answering RQ3,
albeit to a fairly limited extent.
12.1 Research methodology
This section provides a more in depth overview of the research methods and data that
were used to reach the final contributions as well as the design decisions that were made
while developing this part of the research. For more information about which resources
were used to create the below section, please refer to 6.2.
Possible research strategies for this part of the research are described below.
• Survey A survey is not a valid strategy for this part of the research.
• Experiment An experiment could be performed, delivering web content with
different values set for the Cache-Control header, to determine potential differences
in the resulting forensic artifacts.
• Case study A case study is not a valid strategy for this part of the research.
• Desk research To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior research on this
topic. Browser documentation and standards documentation could be reviewed.
Implementations do not always comply with specifications however, so they can
not be used to determine how a browser behaves in practice.
We chose for the experiment strategy, as it seems the most suitable for this part of
the research. Two separate files were set up to be delivered. The first is delivered with
no Cache-Control header set. The second is delivered with Cache-Control: no-store.
For the client machine, we focus on the operating system with the biggest market
share on desktop systems, which is Windows. The choice was made to focus on the four
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browsers with the biggest market share according to the latest statistics from NetMar-
ketshare [net]. Those are Chrome, Edge, Firefox and Internet Explorer. We installed the
latest available version of those browsers on a newly installed virtual machine running
the latest version of Windows 10. We then created a snapshot of the virtual machine in
the clean state. From this stage, we then visited the two respective URLs to fetch the
web content with each browser. For each test, we started from the clean state, to make
sure they did not influence each other. For each experiment, we created a snapshot after
the test and collected a memory and disk image. We then performed forensic analysis
using a copy of the forensic disk image.
The SANS 500 course material [LT20] was used to gain a solid understanding of
browser forensic artifacts. Please note that the cited book mentions the Edge browser
would become Chromium based in the future, but that was not the case yet when the
book was written. As a result there was no specific information about the location of
the current forensic artifact locations for the Edge browser.
12.2 Results
Screenshots of all core evidence can be found in Appendix C.
12.2.1 Chrome
Chrome is a Chromium based browser, developed by Google®. On Windows 10, all
browser artifacts for Chrome can be found at the locations specified below.






The history database is stored in SQLite format. SQLite is a small and simple SQL
database engine [Conb]. We used DB Browser for SQLite [Cona] to view the database
entries. Entries of interest are the visited urls in the urls table. These show that our
test urls were visited. The cache is stored in a different format. We used NirSoft’s
ChromeCacheView1 to parse the cache database entries.
The evidence in Appendix C.2 shows that the urls were visited. There is an entry in
the cache database for the file delivered without Cache-Control header set. There is no




The edge browser is developed by Microsoft®. Since version 79, released in January
2020, the Edge browser is based on Chromium [Micb][Micc]. As a result, the forensic
artifacts have the same structure as those of the Chrome browser. On Windows 10, they
can be found at the locations below.






The evidence in Appendix C.3 shows that the urls were visited. There is an entry
in the cache database for the file delivered without Cache-Control header set. Once
again, there is no entry in the cache database for the file delivered with Cache-Control:
no-store.
12.2.3 Firefox
Firefox is a free, open source browser maintained by the Mozilla Foundation 2. Firefox
has different browser artifacts than Chrome and Edge. places.sqlite contains the history
of the browser. We used DB Browser for SQLite [Cona] to view the database entries.
We also used Nirsoft’s BrowsingHistoryView3 for a different view of the data. Entries of
interest are the visited urls in the moz places table. These show that our test urls were
visited. The cache is stored in a different format. We used NirSoft’s MZCacheView4 to
parse the cache database entries. The forensic artifacts for Firefox can be found at the
below locations.






The evidence in Appendix C.4 shows that the urls were visited. There is an entry in
the cache database for the file delivered without Cache-Control header set. Again, there






12.2.4 Internet Explorer 11 (IE11)
The Internet Explorer browser is developed by Microsoft®. Version is the latest and
final version. Microsoft plans to stop support of Internet Explorer 11 on the 15th of
June 2022. IE11 uses an Extensible Storage Engine database5 to store metadata, such
as cache metadata and browser history. Cached files are stored directly in one of two
possible folders. The forensic artifacts for IE11 can be found at the below locations.
• History %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Edge\User
Data\Default\History
• Cache location 1 %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\InetCache\IE
• Cache location 2 %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\InetCache\Low\IE
The results for IE11 are the same as for the other browsers. The evidence in Appendix
C.5 shows that the urls were visited. There is an entry in the cache database for the
file delivered without Cache-Control header set. Again, there is no entry in the cache
database for the file delivered with Cache-Control: no-store.
12.3 Discussion
In conclusion, all of the browsers investigated did not have any entries in the cache
database for content delivered with cache-control: no-store header set, adhering to the
standard of RFC 7234 [IET]. The file was not cached. The results are summarized in
Figure 12.1.
Browser cache-control: no-store set No cache-control header set
Chrome 91.0.4472.124 No trace in cache File cached
Edge 91.0.864.59 No trace in cache File cached
Firefox version 89.0.2 No trace in cache File cached
IE11 11.789.19041.0 No trace in cache File cached
Table 12.1: Browser cache forensic analysis results
The results show that cyber criminals could set this header as an anti-forensic prac-
tice. Potential follow up research could be to analyze how often this header is set for
malicious content in the wild. If this is often the case, it could be a good feature for
potential machine learning models classifying malicious content. Crawlers searching for
malicious web pages could also be configured to scrutinize content delivered with this
header more than other content. The same logic could be applied to some security tools




browser isolation buyer’s guide [Bro20], one criteria for a browser isolation is the im-
plementation of threat mitigation technologies, such as code analysis. Extra analysis




Final conclusions and reflection
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Chapter 13
Answers to the research questions
and final conclusions
Specific conclusions and recommendations were provided in the separate discussion sec-
tions of the different parts of this research. In this chapter, we provide our answers to
the research questions.
13.1 Answers to the research questions
RQ1-1: How effective are publicly available security web crawlers, one of
the tools used to counter malicious web content delivery, at bypassing cloak-
ing techniques? As expected, high interaction honeyclients such as Cuckoo Sandbox
seem to perform better when it comes to simulating human interaction. Overall, the
effectiveness of publicly available security web crawlers at bypassing cloaking techniques
is low. None of the tested crawlers managed to trigger the malicious payload for at least
50% of the tests.
RQ1-2: How could security web crawlers’ efficacy at bypassing cloaking tech-
niques be improved? Most of the tested crawlers lack support for newer technologies
such as the notification API, or even the latest browser versions. This results in failing
tests across the board. Implementing support for newer technologies or browser versions
could improve results. We do note however that focusing on older browser versions makes
sense, since they are more likely to have known vulnerabilities and thus are probably
targeted more often by attackers. Having configurable parameters for certain browser
attributes such as Referer header or cookies can also improve results.
Lookyloo could implement improved support for newer technologies such as the no-
tification API. Thug could implement improved support for newer technologies such as
the notification API or bootstrap v5. Another potential improvement would be the ad-
dition of a configuration parameter to provide cookies to use when connecting to the url
to analyze.
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Proposed improvements for VirusTotal are to clarify how the URL analysis work,
trigger some content analysis for visited urls and if possible, include a screenshot of the
visited url.
Finally, a first proposed improvement for Cuckoo Sandbox is to provide analysis pa-
rameters to set certain values such as the Referer header or User-Agent header. This
could potentially be achieved by using extensions for the installed browsers and creating
a custom analysis module. Another potential improvement is the implementation of sup-
port for newer operating system and browser versions. A final proposal for development
is to implement more human interaction simulation and if possible, provide parameters
for them. One example could be that instead of clicking cancel on a confirm prompt,
the user of Cuckoo Sandbox has the option to configure Cuckoo to click ok.
RQ1: How effective are commonly used security web crawlers, one of the
tools used to counter malicious web content delivery, at bypassing target-
ing techniques commonly used in cloaking and how could their efficacy in
bypassing these techniques be improved? Overall, the effectiveness of publicly
available security web crawlers at bypassing cloaking techniques is low. None of the
tested crawlers managed to trigger the malicious payload for at least 50% of the tests.
There are several potential improvements for each crawler. High interaction and low
interaction honeyclients each have their own particular, expected, strengths and weak-
nesses. There are clear potential improvements for each of the researched security web
crawlers. As most of these tools have a specific, specialized scope, it is not clear if these
proposed improvements would be considered to be implemented.
RQ2-1: How aware are cyber security professionals and their organisations of
cloaking techniques? Both our MISP community analysis and survey results showed
that the overall awareness of cyber security professionals and their organisations of cloak-
ing techniques is low.
RQ2-2: How prepared are organisations for dealing with malicious web con-
tent delivery attacks using cloaking techniques? While the survey results indi-
cate that organisations are fairly well prepared to deal with malicious web pages, there
is room for improvement there as well, especially when it comes to investigating these
attacks and countering fingerprinting.
RQ2-3: What additional steps can organisations take to improve awareness
and preparedness to deal with malicious web content delivery attacks using
cloaking techniques? Adding structured contextualisation options for cloaking re-
lated metadata in MISP could potentially help with that to some extent. Other blue
team tools, such as browser isolation, can be implemented as well. Security teams can
also add specific analysis steps to cover cloaking. Finally, dedicated security awareness
training on the topic of cloaking attacks can be given to employees.
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RQ2: How aware and prepared are cyber security professionals and their
organisations when it comes to cloaking attacks, and how can their aware-
ness and preparedness be improved? The overall awareness of the topic is low.
Preparedness on the other hand is considerable, mainly due to generic defensive mea-
sures that also cover cloaking attacks. Multiple improvements can be made, as discussed
above.
RQ3: What other techniques can attackers use to thwart analysis of mali-
cious web content delivery attacks? Attackers can use the Cache-Control: no-store
header as an anti-forensic option.
13.2 Final conclusions
Our main goal with this research was to explore the subject of malicious web content
delivery using cloaking. Our initial hypothesis that awareness of this topic amongst
cyber security professionals was low, was confirmed by our research. We believe this
situation should be remediated and hope that this research can help kickstart efforts
in this regard. By discussing not only this problem, but also managerial, anti-forensic
and tooling related concerns, we covered multiple areas that can be explored more in
depth later on. Finally, the implementation of our demonstration cloaking website is an





In this research we explored the topics of cloaking and malicious content delivery via
the web in breadth rather than in depth. Focusing on the concerns of organisations and
cyber security professionals. As a result there is a lack of depth in some of the results,
when comparing it to research with a more limited scope. While this was a conscious
decision, it is still clearly a concern. Follow up research could explore each of the topics
handled by the different parts of this research in more depth.
Aside from that, the total amount of respondents for the survey conducted as part of
this research, 35, is relatively low. This is partly the result of the COVID-19 pandemic,
which caused problems for our survey, since we planned to use networking at conferences
to gather more volunteers. In the early phases of the pandemic, a lot of organisations’ IT
teams also seemed to be focused on making the necessary changes to allow employees to
work from home in a secure way, making us reluctant to reach out to them at that time.
Regardless, better results might have been achieved by more assertively reaching out
to more organisations. To get more representative results, a larger group of employees
should be included for each of the organisations. Informal interviews with some of the
respondents also showed that doing in person interviews as well as questionnaires might
lead to more complete results and allows for clarification of the questions when necessary.
These are our key learnings when it comes to the survey process.
Out of ethical considerations, we did not explore certain potential research avenues.
In particular, we decided not to use real malware on our cloaking website, even though
this might have potentially triggered more VirusTotal hits. While we do mention some
techniques that could be used by cyber criminals, we believe they are not game changers
and publishing this research will not damage the community. We hope that this research
will benefit the IT security community by increasing awareness of certain risks instead.
Finally, some life events and in particular COVID-19, resulted in a temporary slower
pace of research. While this might be understandable, some practices could be used
to prevent this to some extent. In particular, having more regular sync meetings with
the research team and forming a study group with other students, might have aided in
keeping up the pace.
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malicious web content delivery
The below countermeasures are based on prior academic research, professional experience
of the research team and the results of the survey performed as part of this research.
Usage of a proxy server with filter and content analysis A forward proxy can
be used for connections to the internet. Proxy servers can block certain content based on
website reputation or categorization. A proxy can also perform content analysis (anti-
virus scans), before potentially delivering the content to the client. These technologies
block users from accessing certain content which is deemed dangerous or inappropriate.
Browser isolation See subsection 3.6.3.
Fast patching As software becomes older, more vulnerabilities are usually discovered.
For active software projects, maintainers publish patches to fix those vulnerabilities.
The longer a system remains unpatched, the higher the chances someone will exploit the
vulnerability. As a result, patching often and keeping an eye on published vulnerabilities
and exploits, is recommended.
Blacklisting of known bad urls and domains Threat intelligence communities
such as the MISP communities mentioned in this research are sharing information with
regards to known bad urls and domains. Organisations and users can use this type of
information to block access to these urls, thus preventing a potential compromise.
User awareness training Users can be trained to look out for suspicious activity
and potential attacks. The goal in this particular case is for users to avoid performing
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actions that could lead to a compromise, and to report any suspicious web pages they
ended up visiting.
Restriction of allowed web content (usage of adblock, blocking JavaScript)
Some attacks rely on advertisement networks or JavaScript. Using ad blockers or block-
ing JavaScript from executing can prevent such attacks from succeeding.
Usage of endpoint detection tools Endpoint detection tools allows monitoring of
endpoints, and triggering of alerts and automated actions, based on rules to detect
potentially suspicious activity.
Usage of intrusion detection systems Somewhat similar to the above, but often
include monitoring network packets for potentially anomalous behaviour.
Usage of antivirus software on endpoints Antivirus software detects known mal-
ware, often based on a database of known malware signatures.
Usage of threat intelligence Threat intelligence, such as the information shared in
the MISP communities we discussed as part of this research, can be used to assess risk,
choose which protective measures to implement, and to automatically block or look for
traces of known malicious behaviour.
Usage of least privilege principles on devices A mitigation strategy. If a compo-
nent or user of the device is compromised, the attacker will have only those privileges
the component or user had.
Threat hunting A proactive practice, which involves regularly looking for different
types of potential compromises, which might not be detected or prevented by the cur-
rently implemented defenses.
Application of zero trust policy A policy that involves verifying any request, even
those from historically vetted sources.
Vulnerability scanning Defenders can also scan their own systems for vulnerabilities,
with the goal of fixing them as soon as possible after discovery.
Usage of security web crawlers Security web crawlers and in particular, honey-
clients, can be used to crawl the web and search for malicious web pages. Due to their
ability to act as a vulnerable browser, they should be more likely to trigger exploit
delivery, even on malicious web pages using cloaking.
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Appendix B




abuses analysed-with analyzed-with child-of
connects-to contained-within contains created
derived-from drops hosted-in included-in
includes opened owner-of part-of
read-from references related-to same-as
targets
Table B.1: Relationship types used in the COVID-19 MISP community
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Relationship type
abuses analysed-with analyzed-with annotates
attributed-to beacons-to calls captured-by
Characterized By characterized-by child-of communicates-with
connected-from connected-to connects-to contained-by
contained-within contains cooperates-with created
deleted delivered-by derived-from detected-as
detected-with downloaded downloaded-by downloaded-from
downloads downloads-from dropped dropped-by
drops executed-by executes exfiltrates-to
exploits extracted-from header-of hosted-in
impersonates included-in includes indicates
is-in-relation-with linked-to loaded-by located
mentions modified-properties-of moved moved-from
moved-to opened owner-of part-of
read-from received-from redirects-to references
related-to relevant-to rendered-as renders-as
resolved-to resumed same-as screenshot-of
sends sends-to signed-by subdomain
targeted-by targets triggers uploads
used-by uses variant-of Vulnerability abused
weakened-by writes wrote-to





C.1 Test file pages
Figure C.1: Request and response for file delivered with Cache-Control: no-store
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Figure C.2: Request and response for file delivered without Cache-Control
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C.2 Chrome
Figure C.3: Chrome visited URLs history
Figure C.4: Chrome cache entries
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C.3 Edge
Figure C.5: Edge visited URLs history
Figure C.6: Edge cache entries
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C.4 Firefox
Figure C.7: Firefox visited URLs history
Figure C.8: Firefox cache entries
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C.5 IE11
Figure C.9: Internet Explorer 11 visited URLs history
Figure C.10: Internet Explorer 11 cache entries
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Malware delivery via web: awareness of
specific attacker technique
This survey is being performed by Jeroen Pinoy as part of Master thesis research, in scope of the
Computer Science graduate programme at the Open University of the Netherlands (Open
Universiteit Nederland). The research is supervised by assistant professor Dr. Ir. Hugo Jonker.
This questionnaire is divided into sections (displayed as separate pages), each containing a set of
questions. While filling in the questionnaire, it is not possible to go back to previous sections. This
is intentional and important for the validity of the results, please keep this in mind. Please answer
the questions from memory and do not search for answers using google for example.
I would like to thank you in advance for participating in this survey! Note that this survey is
anonymized by default. For part of this research, I need to be able to group responses by
organisation however. If possible, please fill in the name of your organisation or the code word I
sent with my request if you received one, as answer to the related question in the your professional
background section.
Feel free to reach out using one of the below channels in case you have any questions or
comments, or if you would like to receive a copy of my master thesis once it is finished (public pgp
key can be found on the CIRCL key server - https://pgp.circl.lu/ ).
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jeroen.pinoy@fortitude.ninja 
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Open University of the Netherlands (Open Universiteit)
Valkenburgerweg 177, 6419 AT Heerlen, Netherlands
https://www.ou.nl/
There are 33 questions in this survey.
Awareness - part 1
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In the remainder of this survey, questions are always asked in the context of web based cyber
attacks
How would you define "Drive-by compromise"?
Please answer I do not know in case you do not know.
*
Please write your answer here:
What, if anything, can an organisation do to protect itself
against drive-by compromise attacks?
Please answer I do not know in case you do not know.
*
Please write your answer here:
Awareness - part 2
Before continuing, please read the below explanation of drive-by compromise from the MITRE
ATT&CK® framework:
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Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the
normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically
targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for
non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring Application Access Token.
Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:
A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some
form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting.
Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.
Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other
kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that
executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user
controllable web content).
How would you define "Drive-by target"?
Please answer I do not know in case you do not know.
*
Please write your answer here:
Awareness - part 3
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To your knowledge, in what ways can an attacker target a
specific set of clients when executing a drive-by compromise
attack?
Please answer I do not know in case you do not know.
*
Please write your answer here:
Awareness - part 4
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What, if anything, can an organisation do to protect itself
against targeted drive-by compromise attacks? Note that the
emphasis in this case is on targeted attacks.
Please answer I do not know in case you do not know. In
case you wouldn't change your answer compared to the first
question of this survey, which was "What, if anything, can an
organisation do to protect itself against drive-by compromise
attacks?", please answer nothing different from what I
mentioned before.
*
Please write your answer here:
Awareness - part 5
How might an analyst investigate a potential drive-by
compromise attack?
Please answer I do not know in case you do not know.
*
Please write your answer here:
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Does your organisation collect and use cyber threat
intelligence, including threat intelligence about drive-by
compromise attacks? *
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 Yes
 No
 I don't know
 I prefer not to answer this question
Risk - part 1
Please refer to the following definitions from MITRE ATT&CK©:
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection
throughout their compromise.
Vulnerability Scanning: Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can
be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration
of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the
target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.
We argue that vulnerability scanning can be used to selectively target specific systems by only
attempting a compromise if a specific set of vulnerabilities has been detected. This can also be
done to decrease the possibility of detection and is as such a form of defense evasion.
Aside from using vulnerability scanning to select potential victims, other defense evasion
techniques can be used while performing a drive-by compromise attack. Some examples include:
Usage of a compromised site which the target group frequently visits, that is, the watering
hole technique
Check the referer header, for example to verify the user was redirected to the page by clicking
a search engine result
Check for normal user behaviour such as clicking, to counter automatic analysis
Blocking of repeated exploit delivery
IP based
IP based blocklisting, for example using commercial blocklists containing (security related)
web bot IPs
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How likely do you consider it to be that a drive-by
compromise attack using the below techniques is performed
against your organisation? *
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How high would the impact be if your organisation was
compromised by a drive-by compromise using the below
techniques?
*
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Please motivate your choices:
Please write your answer here:
Risk - part 2
Please refer to the following definitions from MITRE ATT&CK©:
Defense Evasion consists of techniques that adversaries use to avoid detection
throughout their compromise.
Vulnerability Scanning: Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can
be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration
of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the
target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.
We argue that vulnerability scanning can be used to selectively target specific systems by only
attempting a compromise if a specific set of vulnerabilities has been detected. This can also be
done to decrease the possibility of detection and is as such a form of defense evasion.
Aside from using vulnerability scanning to select potential victims, other defense evasion
techniques can be used while performing a drive-by compromise attack. Some examples include:
Usage of a compromised site which the target group frequently visits, that is, the watering
hole technique
Check the referer header, for example to verify the user was redirected to the page by clicking
a search engine result
Check for normal user behaviour such as clicking, to counter automatic analysis
Blocking of repeated exploit delivery
IP based
IP based blocklisting, for example using commercial blocklists containing (security related)
web bot IPs
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Did you hear or read about a successful drive-by
compromise attack that was performed in the last two years?
*
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 Yes
 No
 I can't remember
Did one of those attacks you heard or read about use
detection evasion other than vulnerability detection? *
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was 'Yes' at question '11 [RMQ3]' (Did you hear or read about a successful drive-by
compromise attack that was performed in the last two years?)
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 Yes
 No
 I can't remember
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What type of defense evasion did that attack or those attacks
use?
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was 'Yes' at question '12 [RMQ4]' (Did one of those attacks you heard or read about
use detection evasion other than vulnerability detection?)
Please write your answer here:
Defenses - part 1
Which of the following strategies against drive-by
compromise attacks has your organisation implemented?
Please use the other option if you want to add entries.
 Check all that apply
Please choose all that apply:
 Separation of the browser environment from the organisation network (for example
using virtualization), that is, browser isolation
 Usage of antivirus software on the client systems
 Regular updating of browser software
 Disabling javascript
 Usage of a web filter proxy that performs category based web filtering (blocking
gambling sites for example)
 Usage of a web filter proxy that uses antivirus software to perform content analysis
 I do not want to answer this question. (Please note that unless you fill in your
organisation name later in this survey, your answers are anonymized)
Other: 
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Which of those defensive strategies do you consider the
most important?
Please write your answer here:
Please motivate your choice:
Please write your answer here:
Defenses - part 2
Browser fingerprinting refers to the process of collecting information through a web browser and
web server, to build a fingerprint of a device or user, as well as the process of using a previously
determined browser fingerprint to re-identify a user or device. Browser fingerprinting is one of the
main techniques used for targeting in a drive-by compromise attack.
7/21/2021 LimeSurvey Professional - Your online survey service - Malware delivery via web: awareness of specific attacker technique
https://jeroenpinoyresearch.limesurvey.net/admin/printablesurvey/sa/index/surveyid/287171 13/22
Which of the following strategies against browser
fingerprinting has your organisation implemented? Please
use the other option if you want to add entries and note that
we did not repeat the strategies mentioned earlier on
purpose.
 Check all that apply
Please choose all that apply:
 Usage of a browser that attempts to give the same fingerprint for all users, such as Tor
browser
 Usage of a browser that adds randomness to the fingerprintable surface, such as Brave
 Usage of an anti-fingerprinting browser plugin or extension
Other: 
Which of those defensive strategies do you consider the
most important?
Please write your answer here:
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Please motivate your choice:
Please write your answer here:
Defenses - part 3
According to you, should your organisation implement
additional defensive strategies against drive-by compromise
attacks? *
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 Yes
 No
 I do not want to answer this question
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Please motivate your choice:
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was 'Yes' or 'No' at question '20 [DQ3]' (According to you, should your organisation
implement additional defensive strategies against drive-by compromise attacks?)
Please write your answer here:
Investigation - part 1
How should an analyst investigate a drive-by compromise
attack to account for potential defense evasion techniques
used during the drive-by compromise?
Please answer I do not know in case you do not know.
*
Please write your answer here:
Investigation - part 2
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Which of the following strategies to investigate potential
drive-by compromise attacks does your organisation use?
Please use the other option if you want to add entries.
 Check all that apply
Please choose all that apply:
 Usage of a malware analysis sandbox with url analysis capabilities, that is, high-
interaction honeyclients such as Cuckoo Sandbox
 Usage of a physical malware analysis host configured in a similar way as a normal end
user system or the affected system
 Usage of vulnerable browser emulation software. Emulated browsers do not offer full
browser functionality but only implement a limited set of functionality. In that sense they are
different from full browsers installed inside a virtual machine. Examples are low-interaction
honeyclients such as Thug.
 Usage of web based url analysis tools such as VirusTotal and Lookyloo
 Forensic analysis of the affected system
 Usage of different client IP ranges during analysis with honeyclients
 Usage of different operating system and browser combinations during analysis with
honeyclients
 Forensic analysis on network related data, that is, network forensics
 Correlation of gathered data with available threat intelligence
 I prefer not to answer this question
Other: 
Your professional background
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How many years of cyber security related work or research
experience do you have (rounding up to the nearest amount
of years)? *
 Only numbers may be entered in this field.
Please write your answer here:
Which of the following roles is closest to your current job
role? If none of the given roles applies at all, please give your
own description. *
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 cyber analyst (blue team)
 red team member
 IT security manager (middle management)
 chief information security officer (CISO)
 Other 
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Which of the following roles have you performed in your
career, please also check the box if you performed a very
similar role?
 Check all that apply
Please choose all that apply:
 digital forensic investigator / incident responder (this includes SOC analysts)
 threat intelligence analyst
 security engineer (designing and implementing defenses such as security tools and
firewall rules)
 red teamer
 IT security manager (middle management)
 chief information security officer (CISO)
Is the organisation you currently work for part of the public
sector, private sector or not-for-profit sector? *
 Choose one of the following answers





 I prefer not to answer this question
 Other 
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Which of the following categories describe the industry your
organisation is a part of? If none of the given industries
applies, please use the other option. *
 Check all that apply
Please choose all that apply:
 Finance and Insurance
 Telecommunications
 Utilities
 Government and Public Administration
 Education
Other: 
Are you willing to fill in the name of your organisation or the
code word I sent with my request if you received one? This
would solely be used to group survey responses per
organisation. *
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 Yes
 No
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Please fill in the name of your organisation or the code word I
sent with my request if you received one:
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was 'Yes' at question '29 [YPB2]' (Are you willing to fill in the name of your
organisation or the code word I sent with my request if you received one? This would solely
be used to group survey responses per organisation.)
Please write your answer here:
How long has your organisation existed so far?
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was 'No' at question '29 [YPB2]' (Are you willing to fill in the name of your
organisation or the code word I sent with my request if you received one? This would solely
be used to group survey responses per organisation.)
 Choose one of the following answers





 I don't know
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How many employees work at your organisation?
Only answer this question if the following conditions are met:
Answer was 'No' at question '29 [YPB2]' (Are you willing to fill in the name of your
organisation or the code word I sent with my request if you received one? This would solely
be used to group survey responses per organisation.)
 Choose one of the following answers
Please choose only one of the following:
 Less than 10
 Between 10 and 50
 Between 51 and 250
 More than 250
 I don't know
Final comments
That brings us to the end of our survey. Do you have any
comments on the subject of our survey or on the survey
itself?
Please write your answer here:
Thank you very much for participating in this survey. Your answers are valuable for our research!
Please feel free to reach out using one of the below channels in case you have any questions or
comments, or if you would like to receive a copy of my master thesis once it is finished (public pgp
key can be found on the CIRCL key server - https://pgp.circl.lu/ ).
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Submit your survey. 
Thank you for completing this survey. 
